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A REVIEW OF FACTORS DETERMINING CRUDE OIL PRICES 
 
This purpose of this thesis is to form a general understanding on price formation of crude oil 
in the short and the long run. It is motivated by the recent record increase and subsequent 
crash in crude oil prices. The impacts of the price changes were broad and altered industrial 
activity, consumer behavior and political power globally. Understanding the factors behind 
these changes is important for commercial investments and public policy making. 
 
Academics, analysts and politicians seem to disagree on what is the main driver for the oil 
price development. Usual explanations are resource scarcity, cartel behavior, commodity 
speculation and market conditions. This paper examines these central arguments based on 
their theoretical background and observations on the oil market. It aims at explaining recent 
events and describing main drivers for future price development. 
 
Economic theory on exhaustible resources provides a framework for long run price 
development based on increasing scarcity. While it does not explain recent crude oil price 
changes, it shows that prices of exhaustible resources are bound to rise even with perfect 
competition. Extensions to the theory provide possibilities for analyzing increasing costs and 
market power. More accurate models are however also much more complicated and thus not 
easily applicable to price analysis. 
 
Recent high prices were often blamed on speculation, but physical and financial arbitrage 
constraints limit speculators’ possibility to drive prices. If the oil price was being driven 
higher than the market equilibrium, there should have been clear increase in oil inventories as 
supply was kept away from the market. When prices reached record highs, inventories were 
on unusually low levels, implying the contrary. Further studies on market participants’ 
behavior also do not support market manipulation. Recent price changes were most likely due 
to an initially booming and finally crashing demand, which was almost inelastic to prices 
because of the lack of substitutes. Demand reactions were further dampened by government 
subsidies and on the other hand taxes, which made the price changes seem smaller to 
consumers. Oil producers reacted by trying to pump as much oil as possible leading to higher 
costs. Supply limiting cartel behavior, which was common in the 20th
 
 century, was not 
observed in the past few years. While the market has now loosened, it is bound to tighten 
again as demand growth recovers and oil field investments have stalled due to low prices. If 
realistic substitutes do not emerge, there will be further market crunches ahead. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Easy availability of energy has been a key driver of growth and industrialization in the 20th 
century. Bulk of this energy has been generated from non-renewable fossil fuels. The current 
global economy is relying on these fuels as much as ever, most notably oil. Fast logistics is 
the key for success of modern manufacturing industry. People live far away from their work 
and thus rely on automobiles for commuting. Production of countless household and 
industrial goods is using oil-based plastics as raw materials. We are dependent on oil. 
Oil prices have been very volatile in recent years. Volatility in oil prices does harm in many 
ways. Both developing and developed countries are affected. Spiking high prices affect poor 
people more directly because fuel costs are significant in food and transportation prices, 
which are necessary spending. High oil costs also hit economies on a macro-level and have 
been triggering factors in economic cycles. Temporary low prices on the other hand delay 
necessary energy investments in current and alternative sources, which are needed for 
securing supply in the future. Changing prices also make it harder for consumers to learn new 
consumption patterns and look for substitutes. Adding to supply and cost issues are 
environmental concerns, in which oil also has a central role.  
Changes in oil prices shift political balances around the world. Oil exporters gain power with 
high prices, but face severe difficulties when prices drop. Control over oil sources has 
historically driven many countries into war. In August 1941 the United States placed an oil 
embargo over Japan, which blocked 80% of its oil supply. Five months later Japan joined the 
Second World War with the oil embargo being one of the central motivators. Both Persian 
Gulf Wars were also at least partly motivated by securing oil supply. In addition to these, 
natural resources are at stake in many conflicts around the world. 
Despite the large global impacts of oil prices, there seems to be little consensus about the 
most important price drivers and the source of recent volatility. Opinions differ from limited 
supply capacity to abuse of producers’ market power and systematic securities’ speculation. 
There are also many views on when oil is running out and many interpretations of the 
practical consequences of the continuing exhaustion. In comparison to many other markets, 
there is relatively little information available about fundamental factors. Production costs for 
example are highly guarded secrets and cannot be easily figured out for an outsider. The lack 
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and asymmetry of information makes the industry even more mysterious and understanding it 
critically important. 
1.2 Objectives and contribution  
My objective in this paper is simply to understand what factors determine oil prices. I 
approach the question from many angles, both theoretical and practical. Along the way I also 
try to present simplified answers to the following questions: How does the oil market work 
and who are the participants? What has happened in the history of oil? What is the optimal 
way to extract oil? Does OPEC use significant market power? Does the securities market 
drive oil prices? Why did the prices rise to record highs in the past years and why did they 
drop? What is the difference between market fundamentals on the short and on the long run? 
My contribution is to combine the different and partly unrelated theoretical realities of 
different parts of the oil supply chain into one understandable paper. The resulting paper is an 
analytical review into literature and evidence on the oil market. It presents the market and its 
underlying fundamentals to a reader who has no experience on the market or in advanced 
economics. It also reflects my path from gathering high-school level background data and 
learning about the basics of the market, to taking the role of a junior economist and looking 
into the theoretical limits and equilibriums concerned, and eventually weighing different 
factors in a way a commercial market analyst might. 
1.3 Related research 
Underlying economic theory on exhaustible resources is solid and expanding. The principle 
idea of Hotelling (1931) has been expanded by many, such as Solow and Wan (1976) on 
extraction costs, Pindyck (1978) on exploration, and Slade (1982) on technological progress. 
Issues concerning market power have been studied for example by Stiglitz (1976), Salant 
(1976), and Gilbert (1978). The resulting literature has been reviewed notably by 
Krautkraemer (1998) and more recently Gaudet (2007). 
General theory on market price bubbles has been meritoriously reviewed by Brunnermeier 
(2008) and basics of commodity arbitrage can be found in finance literature such as Hull 
(2003). More specific analysis on the oil exchange can be found for example in Borenstein 
(2008). 
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After the high prices of past years many working papers emerged to explain them and the 
market in general. These are for example Hamilton (2008) and Mitchell (2006). At the time of 
writing many papers did not yet take the consequent price drop into account in their analyses.  
Besides academic literature, there are also many organizations such as the International 
Energy Agency of the OECD-countries and the Energy Information Administration of the 
United States Department of Energy, which release many periodical reports and analysis on 
the market. Some reports have also been created for more specific needs such as the Hirsch 
report (2005) on global depletion and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Task 
Force report (2008) on commodity speculation. Many books have been written on certain 
specific market factors, such as Simmons (2005) on Saudi Arabian oil reserves. 
1.4 Limitations and challenges 
This paper is a broad review of issues surrounding oil prices and thus does not go in-depth to 
many of the factors. Understanding the ”big picture” is emphasized over details. My analysis 
focuses on crude oil prices, thus prices of refined oil products are not analyzed directly, but 
only through the demand they reflect on crude oil. The undoubtedly interesting and important 
dynamics between crude oil, natural gas and coal prices is left out of the analysis as well. 
While analyzing the prices I focus mostly on microeconomic concepts. Macro-side 
consequences, such as supply shocks are not considered. Even though extremely topical, 
externalities such as pollution or other emissions and their price effects through taxation or 
allowances are also left out to keep the paper in reasonable focus. 
Finding reliable data on the oil market proved to be surprisingly difficult. Unlike the equity 
markets, publicity of information is not efficiently enforced and many interesting numbers 
and backgrounds remained hidden. Most notably information about production costs, detailed 
production numbers, and OPEC quota compliance were not reliably available thus limiting 
numerical analysis. Also available information differed sometimes significantly from source 
to source. 
One of the largest challenges was the changing market conditions during my analysis. I 
started studying the subject when crude oil prices hit all-time highs and am now finishing my 
analysis after the prices have dropped to 20% of that level and the economy is in a recession. 
While this change was interesting to witness, it made writing this paper somewhat more 
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challenging. Unfortunately many academic analyses on what happened did not make it to this 
paper or even out to the public yet. 
1.5 Definitions of key concepts 
This paper is about the world oil market, but as mentioned I concentrate especially on the 
crude oil market. For sake of simplicity I will make no distinction between actual crude oil 
and the so called non-crude liquids, which are together often called “crude oil” in the press 
and popular sources, even though the technically more correct term would be “liquids”. In 
many sections I will use just "oil" or "petroleum" when referring to crude oil (or actually 
liquids). Petroleum should not be confused with gasoline or petrol, which are names for the 
refined oil-based fuel running automobiles, or other oil products.  
I use oil price in both singular and plural, depending on whether I am describing the concept 
of a price or the actual different crude oil prices around the world. In practice this distinction 
makes very little difference, as most of the concepts introduced in this paper apply to all crude 
oil prices with the same mechanisms and regional differences are evened out through freight 
routes and differing qualities. 
When describing resource theory, I use the terms "exhaustible", "non-renewable", and 
"depletable" interchangeably, even though some might argue that there are technical 
differences between them. 
When talking about oil supply I mean crude oil production, i.e. the process of extracting 
petroleum out of the ground and processing it to a transportable form. The production of oil 
products, on the other hand, is referred to as refining (also "manufacturing" is used in some 
industry sources). Crude oil demand can be understood by either demand coming from oil 
refiners, which are the actual buyers, or end users that consume the refined oil products. I will 
separate the two interconnected demands in parts where it is relevant, but generally consider 
the overall price effect broadly equal. 
1.6 Structure 
Coming up with an appropriate structure for this paper turned out to be challenging. As there 
is no clear empirical part, a traditional division between theory and empirics would have split 
relevant chapters too far from each other. One possible division would have been according to 
the chronology of oil prices, as different factors have driven the prices in different time 
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periods. Another possibility could have been dividing the whole paper into short-term 
analysis and long-term analysis, as fundamental factors differ significantly in different time 
frames. This would have led to having many duplicate parts though. 
The chosen representation is a compromise between many things. In chapter 2 I first describe 
the oil market and its participants in an objective way to build the basis for further analysis. 
The chapter can be skipped if the reader is already familiar with the market or wishes to 
concentrate only on the analysis. Next I go through different concepts affecting the price in 
chapter 3 in the order of the oil supply chain: starting from the ground to the producers and 
going through the exchange to end at the consumer. I present theory and analysis together for 
each subchapter. In the end in chapter 4 I conclude my analysis and sum up issues to be taken 
into account in the future. 
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2 Description of the World Oil Market 
The broad definition of the world oil market consists of a long and wide chain of numerous 
different economic actors acting on multiple markets. Crude oil resides mostly underground 
in deposits that are hard to reach and whose ownership is highly sought after. The deposit is 
extracted by a national oil company or a private company that has acquired necessary rights 
from the government. Before it can be transported, oil has to be separated from water, natural 
gas, and other extracted side products.  
Figure 2.1: Oil (and gas) supply chain (Shell 2007) 
Crude oil is then sold to refiners on spot markets around the world. It arrives at the refineries 
usually by a tanker ship or through an oil pipeline. The refiners use a vast array of chemical 
methods to refine crude oil to various different oil products. These products are then sold on 
further markets to industrial users and retailers. Finally the end products reach consumption in 
the form of transportation fuel, heating, electricity, plastics or numerous other oil-based 
products. 
In the following subchapters I will describe the oil market in more detail. I will go through 
supply and demand drivers and trends as well as introduce central market participants. 
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2.1 The commodity 
Crude oil is arguably the most important natural resource in the world. As mentioned before 
in the introduction, it is present all over the world in many sectors as a provider of 
transportation, heat, electricity or raw materials.  
2.1.1 Origin 
According to the generally accepted theory of fossil fuels, crude oil (as well as other 
hydrocarbons natural gas and coal) has formed over hundreds of millions of years from 
ancient organic materials in sediment layers of the Earth’s crust under high temperatures and 
pressure. More specifically crude oil and natural gas have formed from prehistoric plankton 
and algae on ancient seafloor, whereas coal has formed from remains of prehistoric plants on 
land. (Encyclopædia Britannica 2008) 
The formation process leads to one of the most central points of economic analysis about oil – 
its exhaustibility. Currently the human race is consuming oil millions of times faster than it is 
naturally created, making crude oil practically non-renewable. 
There exists also another theory for oil formation. The abiogenic petroleum hypothesis states 
that crude oil is formed in deep carbon deposits, possibly as old as the Earth itself. This theory 
suggests that biological life forms are not the source of oil, and that there could be much more 
oil in the ground than current estimates suggest. One of the most interesting suggested proofs 
for the theory is the recently observed existence of the natural gas methane in Titan, a moon 
of the planet Saturn, where it could not have been formed through biological processes. 
(Glasby 2006) 
Even though this theory has currently very little proponents (Glasby 2006), it is worth 
mentioning as it would change the fundamentals of future oil supply if it were true. In this 
paper I will still consider the abiogenic oil hypothesis false, and view crude oil as a fossil fuel 
whose exhaustion is a cause of concern.  
2.1.2 Oil grades 
Crude oil reservoirs around the world differ significantly in availability and quality. The main 
attribute for crude oil is its viscosity (thickness). Viscosity is measured by “API gravity”, 
which is an industry standard developed by the American Petroleum Institute. Oil reserves are 
classified by API gravity into light, medium, heavy and extra heavy oils. Beyond extra heavy 
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oils there are oil sands (also tar sands), which contain very thick oil-based bitumen and oil 
shales, which contain solid oil-based kerogen. Both of these non-liquid sources can be heated 
and processed (with high costs and reduced energy efficiency) into liquid oil. Extra heavy 
oils, oil sands and oil shales are often also called non-conventional oils, because their 
extraction requires methods that differ from the more traditional drilling of the lighter grades. 
(SPE 2007) 
Another important quality factor is the sulfur content of the oil. So called “sweet” crude oil 
has a low sulfur content, which means that it is more environmentally friendly and thus 
requires less processing to meet environmental standards. This makes it also more valuable 
than “sour” crude oil with a higher percentage of sulfur. The third important attribute is the 
physical location of the oil source. Depth and qualities of local rock formations play an 
important role in the extraction costs of oil reserves. (Simmons 2005) 
Understanding that crude oil is not homogenous and that the physical and geological 
properties differ between different oil sources is necessary for the economical analysis. The 
availability of easy to reach light and medium oil sources make current oil prices possible, 
while when considering non-conventional oils extraction costs rise to levels that are currently 
uneconomic. In addition to extraction, lighter fuels are also cheaper and more versatile to be 
refined further to oil products. 
Table 2.1: Oil Grades (data: Alboudwarej et al 2006) 
Oil Grade API Gravity Percentage of global proven 
reserves (9-13 trillion bbl) 
Light > 31,1º 
30% 
Medium 31,1º - 22,3º 
Heavy 22,3º - 10,0º 15% 
Extra Heavy 
< 10,0º 
25% 
Oil sands and oil shales 30% 
 
2.1.3 Non-crude liquids, biofuels and synthetic substitutes 
Refined oil products can also be produced from sources other than crude oil. The before 
mentioned non-crude liquids are hydrocarbons that come as side products in different phases 
in crude oil or natural gas production and are liquid in normal atmospheric pressure. Many of 
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these liquids are of high quality and can be used as raw material in refineries in the same way 
as light or medium crude oil. The use of these side products is increasing as production 
technology advances and efficient recovery is focused on. 
Maybe the currently most prominent alternative source to drilled crude oil comes from the 
nature in the form of biofuels. Often classified to either bioethanol or biodiesel, these fuels are 
made from a range of different plants and can power many types of modern combustion 
engines with little or no modifications. Biofuels have quickly gained popularity and also some 
notable production after the oil price hikes in recent years. They are also considered more 
environmentally friendly as their life cycle releases less green house gases to the atmosphere. 
The most recent opposition has risen from the fact that biofuel production partially competes 
with food production, which has been claimed to be one of the factors behind recent growth in 
food prices. Nevertheless research in biofuels continues and studies suggest that in the future 
it may be possible to grow biofuels in areas where food could not be grown, thus removing 
the problem of competition. (IEA 2007) 
Oil products can also be made synthetically through chemical processes. The most notable 
process is the so called “Fischer-Tropsch synthesis”, which can produce petroleum substitutes 
from coal or natural gas. Synthetic processes are currently not widely utilized, as they are still 
relatively expensive and environmentally unfriendly. They still appear in many future 
projections of the aviation industry, especially military aviation, as electrical engines or 
biofuels do not currently offer enough power for aircraft jet engines. (Encyclopædia 
Britannica 2008) 
In this paper I will consider non-crude liquids as a part of crude oil. Many statistical sources 
also include but do not separate them in their oil figures. Synthetic substitutes are currently 
only of interest when thinking about the upper cost limits in the oil supply curve and I will 
return to that later. Biofuels are usually only economically viable with government support 
based on climate issues. Thus they fall out of the scope of this paper. 
2.2 Reserves 
Demand for oil and suitable extraction techniques started to emerge in the mid-19th century. 
In the following 150 years many great oil discoveries were made around the world. During 
the last decades however, new oil field discoveries have become scarcer and of lower quality. 
New oil fields are often found in deep waters or consist of non-conventional oil grades. Many 
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industry sources have estimated that most of the high quality and easily available oil fields 
have already been discovered (Simmons 2005).  
Oil discovery and reserve development is a long and complicated process. The size of 
discovered oil reserves is a matter of great uncertainty. Sizes are determined based on various 
geological methods that yield probabilities, which are further classified by technical and 
economical feasibility. 
The largest estimate of the whole field size is called petroleum initially in place (PIIP, or 
OOIP: original oil in place). It describes the total volume of oil inside the reserve. Of this oil 
only a fraction is usually recovered. Estimated ultimate recovery (EUR, or the recovery 
factor, or the basin potential), as the name says, represents the fraction that will probably be 
recovered using current knowledge during the life of the reserve. According to Simmons 
(2005) EUR ranges from as little as 5% to even 80% depending of the viscosity of the oil and 
qualities of rock formations. For example typical Saudi Arabian light crude fields have an 
EUR of 20% - 45%. These reserve size figures are often criticized as they are based on very 
broad estimates. Simmons (2005) states that initial PIIP estimates are often over- or 
underestimating the reserve by even 60% - 80%. He goes as far as saying that the estimates 
are “not far from educated guesses”. 
The size of oil reserves is naturally also very important for market participants analyzing the 
oil price and estimating values of oil companies. Therefore industry organization, foremost 
the World Petroleum Council (WPC) and the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) have 
defined more detailed guidelines for oil reserve classification. The newest revision of the 
Petroleum Reserve Management System is from 2007. 
14 
 
Figure 2.2: Oil resource classification (SPE 2007) 
The above figure describes the classification of the petroleum resource management system. 
According to the system, PIIP is divided into three subgroups: reserves, contingent resources, 
and prospective resources. Reserves are further divided into proven, probable and possible 
reserves. These three are often shortened to 1P, 2P, and 3P representing recovery probabilities 
of 90%, 50%, and 10% accordingly. Proven reserves, or 1P, are “the reserves” that oil 
companies are to report according to the rules of the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Proven reserves can also by further divided to developed and 
undeveloped ones depending on whether they have built capacity for production. 
Estimated ultimate recovery is not usually a clear aggregate of any of these subgroups. It is 
best understood as a figure that contains all already produced oil and remaining reserves that 
are currently technologically and economically viable. Proven reserves, as well as EUR, are 
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both affected by the changes in crude oil price. Higher prices enable oil to be extracted with 
higher costs from places that are harder to reach and thus allow larger reserve estimates. 
According to Simmons (2005) individual oil fields vary significantly in size. There are over 
4000 producing oil fields in the world, but 20% of global production comes from only 14 so 
called “super giant” fields. Saudi Arabia is an extreme example where 90% of production 
comes from five fields. One of them, worlds largest oil field Ghawar,  accounts alone for 60% 
of Saudi production, and for over 6% even globally. 
Figure 2.3: World proven oil reserves 2007 (data: IEA 2007) 
The above figure clearly shows how unevenly oil reserves are distributed globally. Middle 
East dominates the figure with a share of over 60%, from which Saudi Arabia represents 
alone globally over a fifth. As mentioned earlier, reserve estimates are not very reliable. 
Additionally, reports of national reserves may be biased at least in less open economies, as oil 
ownership equals political power. Reported Saudi reserves for example have remained exactly 
the same for many years, even though they produce over 3% of their reserves annually (BP 
2008). Thus above reserve distribution should be interpreted critically. 
2.3 Supply 
Before the 1970’s the oil business was dominated by seven western companies. These “Seven 
Sisters”, as they were called, operated around the world and were involved in most significant 
oil field developments (Simmons 2005). After the oil crisis in the 1970’s and following 
political developments, oil production around the world has been nationalized to a large 
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extent. Today multinational companies control only 5% (Simmons 2005) of global oil 
reserves, but have remained as important partners in refinement and new oil production 
projects. I choose to examine oil production by country, which in most cases corresponds 
precisely to the national oil company. 
2.3.1 Oil producers 
The largest oil producers are roughly the countries with the largest reserves, although 
developed economies have managed to utilize their reserves more effectively and have a 
lower reserves-to-production ratio. In 2007 total world crude oil production averaged at 81,5 
million barrels per day, amounting to a total of 3,9 billion metric tons total (IEA 2007). 
Figure 2.4: Oil production in thousands of barrels per day in 2007 (data: BP 2008) 
The Middle Eastern producers dominate in production numbers as they do in reserves. It is 
notable that especially Russia and the United States produce at a very high rate despite their 
relatively lower reserves. Many developed countries have once produced at higher rates, but 
are experiencing production decline because of depleting and degrading reserves. 
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Since the 1970’s some of the most notable oil exporters have furthered their interests through 
OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC represents over half of 
worlds oil exports (OPEC 2008) and is usually regarded the single most powerful player in 
the oil market. Other oil producers are very loosely represented through the IEA (International 
Energy Agency), which is a sister organization of and sharing the same developed member 
countries with OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). It is 
notable that such significant producers and/or consumers as Russia, China and India are not 
members of either of these organizations. 
I will return especially to OPEC in later parts of this paper regarding historical developments 
and the role of market power. 
2.3.2 Extraction technology 
The romanticized image of oil production with crude oil raining down after bursting from vast 
underground lakes is unfortunately misleading. In reality crude oil is located inside porous 
rock formations, which vary in accessibility and porosity1
As new reserves are found oil indeed flows to the surface with its own pressure and the 
assistance of the groundwater pressure below it. The natural pressure however declines in a 
few years and it needs to be sustained artificially. This is usually done by injecting (pumping) 
water into the reserve. For example the Saudi Arabian national oil company ARAMCO 
currently injects twice the volume of water into its fields as it extracts oil from them. The 
process is often referred to as secondary recovery. The extracted material is a mixture of 
water, natural gas and oil, all of which need to be set apart in separation facilities before the 
products can be transported and sold. The amount of water depends on the age of the reserve 
and the rate at which it is extracted (new water injected). If the extraction rate is too high, 
water may also flow past some oil and leave it practically unrecoverable. (Simmons 2005) 
. In most cases the formations have 
varying amounts of natural gas on the top parts, crude oil in the middle and groundwater 
below. These rock formations are found in varying depths underground or under the seabed. 
(Simmons 2005) 
                                                 
1 Porous rocks can best be understood as rocks with holes or bubbles of oil in them. These bubbles intersect each other in many points and 
thus allow the oil to flow through the rock. 
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As oil producers have learned more and more about the decline and problems of oil reserves, 
they have also developed new technologies to ease extraction. Advances in offshore drilling 
technology have made many new reserves accessible. Modern drilled oil wells consist of 
branching vertical and horizontal pipes, which can be guided towards parts of the reserve that 
were impossible to reach before. Rock formations are studied with three-dimensional seismic 
and magnetic instruments, while in the earlier days of oil discoveries studies were based only 
on test drilling and visually observed surface formations. (Simmons 2005, IEA 2007) 
One of the most promising technologies is referred to as EOR, or Enhanced Oil Recovery.  It 
achieves higher recovery rates than traditional secondary recovery, by pumping CO2 or other 
gases into the oil well. As with water injection, CO2 increases pressure but it also dissolves 
into the crude oil and increases viscosity. CO2 injection is expensive, but it also has 
interesting environmental implications enabling the greenhouse gas to be returned to where it 
came from. This is called CCS, Carbon Capture and Storage. (IEA 2007) 
The above mentioned challenges and technologies concern conventional oil reserves. Non-
conventional sources, such as oil shales and oil sands require even more complicated 
processes including crushing, warming and distillation. This naturally makes them also 
clearly more expensive to extract. (Shell 2007) 
These geological realities give insights to the nature of the resource and are important to 
understand when studying crude oil production. The complexity of infrastructure involved 
also explains the far reaching time frame of oil field investments and long lead times for new 
production. Issues like oil reserve decline and technological progress can also be analyzed in 
the framework of economic theory. I will return into these issues and their theoretical 
presentations in following chapters. 
2.3.3 Transport and refining 
Extracted crude oil is transported to buyers’ refineries and storage tanks usually by oil tankers 
or pipelines, while trucks and trains are used more with refined oil products. Refineries 
process crude oil through many distillation cycles, which yield in a variety of oil products. As 
described earlier, lighter and sweeter oil grades are easier to refine into premium products and 
are thus more valuable. 
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Figure 2.5: Main oil distillates from heaviest to lightest (data: Shell 2007) 
I will not go further into the refining industry in this paper. It is however important to note 
that crude oil is always just a raw material for oil products, which are then consumed by end-
users creating demand. 
2.4 Demand 
Crude oil demand is driven by the demand for aforementioned refined oil products. There are 
large regional differences, with the developed OECD countries representing 57% of world 
demand. The demand comes also from many sources, but the two main sectors: transportation 
and industry represent 85% of the total globally. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Crude oil demand by sector 2007 (data: EIA 2007) 
It is notable that industry uses also many other sources of energy, but transportation is almost 
solely dependent on crude oil products for its energy needs. 
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2.4.1 Transportation demand 
The transportation sector is clearly the largest user of crude oil products globally. It is also the 
largest in practically all individual countries regardless of the standard of living. It includes 
road, rail, air, and water transportation. The sector can be roughly divided into personal and 
industry driven transportation, which are both driven by population and economic growth. As 
economic activity grows, industrial output grows and transportation demand increases for raw 
materials as well as manufactured goods. This trend has been further emphasized by the 
development of global logistic networks. Increased personal incomes and urbanization have 
increased the demand for transportation also on the personal level. (EIA 2008) 
The transportation sector is currently completely dependent on oil products, which represent 
98% of the sector’s energy use. Long periods of low fuel prices have led the transportation 
infrastructure and industry to be built around oil products. Even with higher oil prices 
substituting technologies have had hard times to gain foothold. Growing oil prices have also 
increased focus on the fuel economy of transportation vehicles. Developments in fuel 
economy are still constrained by availability of technology and capital. Consumer trends play 
also a role in private transportation. (EIA 2008) 
2.4.2 Industrial demand 
The industry sector has two different uses for oil products. Firstly, they are used as energy to 
generate power or heat for industrial processes. Secondly, they are used as raw materials for 
manufactured products such as plastics, industrial chemicals or asphalt. Industrial output is 
generally driven by economic growth as mentioned earlier.  
Industry is not as dependent on oil as transportation is. Its energy needs can be easily 
substituted with a variety of power generation methods. Energy efficiency can also be 
improved by developing new technologies. As a raw material, oil is harder to substitute. 
Recent materials research and improvements in recycling have still lowered industry 
dependence in developed countries. (EIA 2008) 
2.4.3 Other sectors’ demand 
The remaining three sectors; electric power and heating, residential demand and commercial 
demand, account for the remaining 15% of oil products consumption. In the case of oil 
products, energy use in residential and commercial sector means locally heating, cooling, 
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lighting and cooking. Electric power and heating on the other hand are centrally produced and 
distributed. (EIA 2008) 
Energy is produced locally mostly in developing countries. Because of easy availability and 
transportation, oil products are the energy of choice especially in remote areas. Central 
electricity and heating are linked to the standard of living and are thus used more in developed 
countries. Oil is very insignificant in central electricity generation and even though there are 
not as many substitutes for heating, oil is losing share to other fossil fuels because of 
relatively high prices. (EIA 2008) 
2.4.4 Demographics and Geography 
Even though the sectors and their order remains mostly the same around the world, demand 
differs much regionally. Developed western economies consume significantly more oil 
products per capita than developing countries. 
 
Figure 2.6: Oil consumption in selected countries in 2007 (data: BP 2008, EIA 2008) 
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Even large producing OECD countries are net importers because of their proportionally high 
demand. Developing oil producers on the other hand often subsidize their domestic oil to 
boost demand and harbor economic activity. This is true also for some developing net 
importers, most importantly China. Developed countries especially in Europe on the other 
hand have laid heavy taxes on oil products. 
 
Figure 2.7: Oil intensity of GDP (ITF 2008) 
Oil demand has developed hand in hand with global economic growth for decades. It is 
however anticipated that the relationship is loosening in the future. Oil intensity of the GDP 
has been already falling in OECD countries, as well as some developing countries, in past 
decades. (ITF 2008) This may be a result of individuals starting to prefer efficiency over 
luxury in transportation, and development of more efficient processes in industry. These 
ecological trends and efficiency increases can lead to the decrease of oil demand’s income 
elasticity in the future.  
2.5 Exchange 
Oil suppliers and buyers meet on commodity exchanges. Commodity exchanges trade in 
options, futures and physical delivery of crude oil and various oil products. There are 
currently two major exchanges in which oil is traded: the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) in New York City and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in London and Atlanta. 
Oil is traded in numerous different qualities, but three light oil blends are regarded as 
benchmarks representing also major oil production areas: West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”, 
United States), Brent Blend (North Sea, Europe) and Dubai Crude (also “Fateh”, UAE, 
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Middle East)2
2.5.1 Participants 
. These benchmarks’ prices are heavily correlated; WTI and Brent have been 
almost equal for decades, with their spread for twenty years averaging at $1.44 in favor of 
WTI. The OPEC Reference Basket is often seen as a fourth central benchmark. It is not an oil 
blend itself but a weighted average of 13 blends across OPEC member countries. Unlike the 
three primary benchmarks, the OPEC basket includes also some heavy oils. (NYMEX, ICE 
2008) 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTCF), an agency of the US government 
monitoring the NYMEX, classifies participants in the exchanges into two main categories: 
commercial and non-commercial. Commercial participants include oil producers, oil refiners 
(-manufacturers), oil traders and swap traders. These participants are in the market either to 
trade oil or to hedge their business-related risks in oil. Non-commercial participants on the 
other hand do not have a direct business-link to oil and are thus often called speculators3
2.5.2 Spot and Futures contracts 
. 
These are further split into two sub-groups, namely hedge funds and floor brokers. (ITF 2008) 
The spot price of crude oil is not actually a current price, but a one-month forward agreement, 
also called “front month”. This is due to the nature of oil, which requires time for the physical 
delivery, unlike currencies or securities. In the NYMEX for example, trading for the spot 
delivery closes three business days prior to the 25th
                                                 
2 All of the major oil benchmarks (as well as practically all minor ones) are denominated in US Dollars. This is 
due to the history of the industry and helps price comparisons across markets. The significance of the 
denomination has been under debate in the press and has also stemmed discussion about the foreign policy of the 
United States. To address this issue the Republic of Iran opened its own oil bourse on the free-trade-zone of 
island Kish on the gulf of Persia. The Iranian oil bourse accepts all major currencies except for the dollar. 
(Reuters 2007) Because of the obvious political motivations, economics impacts of developments like these are 
hard to evaluate.  
 calendar day of the month preceding the 
delivery. The commodity is then to be delivered by the end of the delivery month according to 
further details. The oil is made available at an announced location and the buyer transports it 
then further with his own cost. After the close date, the market will continue trading for the 
next spot month. (Borenstein 2008) 
 
3 The classification into commercial and non-commercial participants is not completely interchangeable with the 
division to hedgers and speculators, as also commercial traders may participate in some speculation even if their 
main transactions in the market are risk-driven hedging. (ITF) 
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Delivered spot contracts represent only a small amount of trading volumes on commodity 
exchanges. Most liquid contracts can be also settled in cash between the counterparties. 
During the past five years, only 2% of all traded contracts resulted in physical delivery (ITF 
2008). Futures contracts are standardized exchange traded forward contracts. Unlike forwards, 
which are paid at the time of delivery, futures are “marked-to-market” meaning that they are 
settled and paid in the end of each trading day during the contract period. The daily settlement 
reduces the default risk of the other participant. The NYMEX trades oil futures for the next 
nine years. There are contracts for each month of the five first years and two monthly 
contracts per year for the following four. All of these contracts do not however necessarily 
exist if there is no trade in them. (NYMEX 2008, Pindyck 2001) 
2.5.3 Market information 
For the spot and futures markets to be efficient, all information should be equally available to 
all market participants. This is however not the case in reality. NYMEX and ICE provide data 
about exchange prices and regulators keep track of derivative positions, but information about 
more fundamental factors is missing. While oil demand is constantly forecasted along with 
other economic forecasts by national and international institutions, oil supply, capacity, costs 
and reserve information are scarce. This is due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the clear 
majority of oil is produced by national oil companies, who do not generally disclose their 
detailed production data. Usually only broad aggregates are reported. 
The International Energy Agency (of OECD) and Energy Information Administration (of the 
US Department of Energy) as well as many financial institutions gather public data into 
periodical publications. Unfortunately some of their sources, especially OPEC, are neither 
specific nor reliable (Hamilton 2008). Some specialist companies such as Petro-Logistics also 
provide intelligence on oil production. They gather their data for example by literally tracking 
tankers and estimating their loads by the draft of their hull. According to Hamilton (2008), 
even OPEC uses third party sources in their reporting, instead of numbers provided by 
member countries themselves. Marginal production costs are one of the key issues in price 
forecasting, but unfortunately they are maybe the most guarded secrets of national oil 
companies. Some researchers have also tried alternative approaches. The most famous one is 
probably Simmons (2005), who estimated the production capacity of Saudi Arabia by going 
through and aggregating numerous reports from engineering research papers. While 
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production capacity may be figured out with thorough investigation, the actual size of oil 
reserves is still practically impossible to estimate from an external point of view. 
All in all, production information of the most important commodity in the world is scarce and 
some of it is not freely available. Forecasting is hard as even sizes of oil reserves or built 
production capacity cannot be reliably verified. This raises doubt that oil market participants 
may be trading with asymmetric information, theoretically leaving room for market bubbles 
and other inefficient and unfair behavior. I will analyze this possibility further in a dedicated 
subchapter.  
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3 Analysis of price factors 
As stated before in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to understand the structure and 
central drivers of the oil market. To reach this goal I will examine different views of oil price 
formation and their theoretical basis. After going through the relevant history of the market I 
will present Hotelling's theory on exhaustible resources. In the following subchapters I will 
use Hotelling's framework as a reference to understand the long term nature of the market. I 
will further introduce shorter term concepts on market equilibrium conditions and price 
bubbles. Lastly I will analyze short and long term equilibriums based on presented concepts 
and specific market features.  
The analysis is organized in the form of a stylized oil supply chain. It starts from long term 
questions of oil ownership, market power and production planning. Then it deals with short 
term issues in the actual marketplace where trade is made. Lastly it presents oil demand 
drivers and matches them with short and long term supply. I will introduce theoretical 
concepts, empirical evidence and analytical reasoning side-by-side for each of the given 
topics. Before further analysis however, I will now take a look at the observed time series of 
crude oil price and related history of the market. 
3.1 Historical price developments 
The history of oil prices can be divided roughly into three different periods: a calm beginning 
when oil supply was totally adequate for all demand needs, a middle period when political 
events and market power shaped the price path, and the present period where the effect of 
politics is decreasing and the price is affected by more fundamental factors in supply and 
demand. While it is pretty clear that oil price development cannot be forecasted statistically 
based on historical prices, it is interesting to examine different periods in the time series. 
3.1.1 History of oil before the 1970's 
The history of oil dates back at least four thousand years. Oil was first found in oil pits 
throughout the Middle East and used in construction, lighting and medicine. First oil wells 
were drilled in ancient China over two thousand years ago. The history of modern oil began in 
the mid-19th century when significant breakthroughs in drilling and distillation technology 
were made. Driven by demand for kerosene lighting, the industry began growing. For many 
decades gasoline was just a byproduct of refined kerosene. After the invention of the internal 
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combustion engine and further by the first automobiles, gasoline became the main product. 
Demand for transportation grew in the industrializing world and the oil market boomed 
alongside, even though electric light bulbs made kerosene lighting obsolete. Oil demand was 
further increased by the World Wars, where motorized transport played a key role. It was with 
warfare when oil’s strategic significance was first realized. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008) 
In the mid-20th
• Standard Oil of New Jersey (renamed later Esso and merged with Mobil) 
 century seven international oil companies dominated oil production and 
refinement. The “Seven Sisters”, as they were called, were:  
• Royal Dutch Shell  
• Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed later BP) 
• Standard Oil Co. of New York (renamed later Mobil and merged with Esso) 
• Standard Oil of California (renamed later Chevron) 
• Gulf Oil (merged later with Chevron) 
• Texaco (merged later with Chevron) 
At that time the United States was the largest oil producing country in the world. Prices 
remained low because oil fields of that time were still their young phase and production was 
cheap. New advances in extraction technology, scale benefits, and increased competition 
actually pushed nominal oil prices down for long periods of time. Actually still in the 1960’s 
most industry analyst suggested that oil prices would continue slowly falling and stay down 
“for ever”. (Simmons 2005)  
At the same time major oil discoveries were made in the Middle East, which would eventually 
become world’s leading oil region. All major oil companies had ventures around the world, 
and their dominance of the industry was indisputable. As mentioned earlier, private oil 
companies account for only 5% of present day oil production. This is largely due to events of 
the 1970’s that proved oil’s power as a political asset and started the nationalization of oil 
resources. (Simmons 2005) 
3.1.2 Political events affect prices in 1970 – 2000 
In 1973 Arab states Egypt and Syria attacked US-backed Israel in what would be called the 
Yom Kippur War. This was in continuation for the Six-Day War fought in 1967, where Egypt 
and Syria lost territories to Israel. The Israelis were short on weapons and supplies making 
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them reliant on the west, if they were to win the war. Saudi Arabia had created a close 
relationship with the United States through oil ventures at that time. Their King Faisal was 
however not happy that the US supported the Israelis in a fight against their fellow Arabs.  
When the United States announced that they would re-supply Israel with weapons, King 
Faisal decided to use the “oil sword”. He gathered ten fellow Arab oil ministers and they 
quickly announced a collective supply reduction of 5%. This was the first time that OPEC 
rose into public knowledge. Saudi Arabia would itself cut production by 10% and place the 
United States and the Netherlands (a major oil shipping hub) to an oil embargo. Saudis also 
quickly nationalized 20% of their national oil company ARAMCO. In the following years 
they further increased the share to 60%, and soon to 100%.  Other OPEC-members would 
follow their example. 
The cut did not represent a large share of global production at that time, but it was enough to 
send the oil price soaring from a little over $4 to approximately $10 per barrel in just one 
month. Other oil producing countries did not have excess capacity to compensate for the 
production drop. This was the first time when the oil market showed its inelasticity, a feature 
that would continue to move prices from then on. Another reason for the strong price reaction 
was psychological. Market participants had to start thinking about oil in a completely new and 
different way. The 1970’s brought politics to the oil market and the dependence on production 
from Middle East materialized. (Simmons 2005) 
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Figure 3.1: Nominal and real oil price and political events 1945-2007 (data: BP 2008, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2009) 
The oil price was to rise even higher. In 1979, Iran was shaken by a revolution, which 
disrupted production. The new government didn’t manage to stabilize production before Iraq 
attacked Iran starting the Iran - Iraq War in 1980, which would last for eight years. Both 
Iranian and Iraqi production was significantly affected. Oil price had already been rising from 
the last crisis to about $18. The war caused it to jump to a high of $40 (over $100 in 2008 
dollars).  
In the following years the oil price decreased steadily, as a result of decreasing demand, and 
increasing competition as capacity was again available. OPEC was unable to act as a group to 
keep production down, as they had managed to do in 1973. Saudi Arabia started to 
unilaterally cut back its production in 1982, but other OPEC members did not follow. The 
dramatic price drop happened in 1986, when OPEC again failed to reach an agreement, and 
the Saudis decided to begin full production again resulting in a price war with the oil price 
falling under $12. As a result, OPEC’s ranks were tightened again, and the price recovered to 
around $18 for the next few years. 
In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, which led to the Persian Gulf War, and the oil price bounced 
again to $35. Saudi Arabia however compensated for the production distortion rather quickly, 
and the Gulf War, even though it was a major political event globally, didn’t affect oil prices 
as much as previous crises. 
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The first major demand-side event in the history of crude oil prices was the Asian Financial 
Crisis that begun in 1997. The promising increase in oil demand from Southeast Asian 
countries resulting from the “Asian economic miracle” suddenly turned to a decrease. 
Nominal GDP’s in the region decreased tens of percents from ’97 to ’98. Oil price dropped 
momentarily to as low as $8. The price drop also partly triggered the Russian financial crisis 
in 1998, as Russia’s main exports were (and still are) crude oil and natural gas. 
3.1.3 The new oil market 2000 - 
In the 21st
Figure 3.2: Nominal WTI price in different currencies, 2000-2008 (data: BP 2008, Bank of 
Japan 2009, European Central Bank 2009) 
 century oil prices increased to new records as well as crashed with a record speed 
as the current economic crisis hit in fall 2008. The role of politics or market power has 
however been much smaller this time around. The Second Gulf War in 2003 had only a small 
and short effect in the price even though the conflict is still not over in 2009. OPEC on the 
other hand actually increased production as prices were rising in 2003 – 2008. 
Before the crash of 2008, the depreciating dollar was often raised as an explanation for the 
rising prices. In the above graph we can see that the price change was not as extreme in Euros. 
The comparison is still not that simple. There are many reasons why currencies and traded 
commodity prices are not independent of each other, but I will not go into that in detail. It is 
however clear from the graph that prices were driven up also by other factors. In the 
following subchapters, I will look into possible explanations.  
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3.2 Basic resource theory 
Economic theory provides a good starting point for understanding oil price developments. 
Hotelling's theory on exhaustible resources (1931) can be considered the basic theory for 
understanding fundamental factors in long-term price development of depletable 
commodities. Despite its significance, the theory didn't get much attention before the oil crisis 
in the 1970’s. This was because adequacy of natural resources for sustained growth wasn't a 
main concern before the Second World War and also because Hotelling's work was 
considered mathematically difficult for the economics of that time. After the oil crisis 
however, Hotelling's theory became the basis for following papers and is still one of the 
central works in the field. (Gaudet 2007) 
3.2.1 Hotelling's rule 
The idea of the theory can be best understood by comparing a stock of exhaustible resources 
with a more general description of a capital asset in a market economy. The value of a capital 
asset is dependent on the rate of return it yields to its owner. In his primer to Hotelling's 
theory Gerard Gaudet (2007) divides the rate of return into three factors: 
1. Marginal productivity or dividend rate 
2. Change of characteristics over time 
3. Rate of change in the asset's market value 
For the asset market to be in equilibrium, the rate of return (comprised from the three 
components) needs to be equal with the return of selling a marginal unit of the asset and 
investing it in a riskless bond. In other words: the rate of return must equal the rate of interest 
(this statement does not take into account risk and associated reward for the sake of 
simplicity). 
Exhaustible resources, like oil, are different from many industrial assets. Holding them in 
stock is not productive and thus does not yield any dividend. Also their physical 
characteristics do not generally change over time. (The overall quality of a mine or an oil well 
might still degrade over time, but I will return to that later.) Left as the only source of return is 
the third component: the rate of change in the resource's market value. (Gaudet 2007) 
The marginal value of the resource in the ground is often called the in situ value or scarcity 
rent. In practice it is the opportunity cost of extracting the resource instead of leaving it in the 
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ground. In this case, the in situ value of the exhaustible resource is simply its price on the 
market minus its extraction costs. The in situ value can be written as 
 𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) 
 
(1)  
with p(t) as the current market price, c(t) the unit extraction cost and π(t) the in situ value at 
date t. 
Hotelling's rule states that the growth rate of the in situ value of an exhaustible resource must 
equal the interest rate 
 ?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡)
𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 
 
(2)  
where r is the risk free interest rate. This reflects the opportunity cost of the alternative 
interest yielding the interest rate r. 
It is simple to estimate the growth in the market price of the natural resource, if we assume 
that extraction costs do not depend on the extraction rate and are invariant over time. This 
gives the following equation for change in market price 
 ?̇?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)� 
 
(3)  
This should lead to a situation where the market price grows first slower than the interest but, 
as the share of the extraction costs gets smaller and smaller, approaches the interest rate over 
time. 
For most exhaustible resources however, this has not been an observed price path. According 
to Gaudet (2007), price changes during the last hundred years for copper, lead, zinc, coal, 
petroleum, tin, aluminum, nickel, and natural gas have been very volatile, but have not 
followed changes in interest rates. There are no significant observed trends that would suggest 
behavior according to Hotelling's rule, as the mean price changes are not significantly 
different from zero. This observation still does not mean that Hotelling's theory should be 
abandoned. To explain more realistic price paths, the theory needs to be refined by adding 
more factors.  
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3.2.2 Degradation cost 
One important factor affecting the extraction costs over time is the accessibility and/or quality 
of the resource. This is linked to the second component of asset valuation, which accounts for 
the resource stock's change of characteristics over time (Gaudet 2007). As a resource is 
extracted, it gets harder to reach and becomes of lower quality. This "degradation cost” 
(Solow and Wan 1972) can be though as "going deeper into a mine" or "drilling deeper into 
an oil well" towards the last and worst pieces of the resource. Lower quality can also be 
thought of as the need for further (costly) refinement to reach the same homogenous 
marketable good. As degradation is very common in the real world, Krautkraemer (1998) 
considers this form as being the “basic” formulation of Hotelling’s rule. 
It is now useful to go beyond the simple opportunity cost -explanation of Hotelling’s rule and 
show it’s derivation through maximal utility. The goal in the problem is to maximize the 
resource stock owner's utility over all future time. The utility of the owner at any point in time 
is the profit he gets from the amount of resources extracted at that time, which is defined as 
�𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡). The following is the maximization problem with the integral over 
profits discounted to their present value 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡) 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞0  
?̇?𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0 
 
(4)  
where s(t) is the remaining resource stock, which is depleted at speed q(t). 
The Hamiltonian function4
 
 of this problem is 
𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡, 𝜆𝜆) = 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡) − 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡) (5)  
With the shadow price (current opportunity cost or in situ value) and its time dynamics 
 𝜆𝜆 = 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑠𝑠)� 
?̇?𝜆 = 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐′(𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞) 
 
(6)  
                                                 
4 The Hamiltonian is a central function of optimal control theory. For further details see for example Kamien and 
Schwartz (1991). 
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When denoting the current in situ value as 𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , it can be solved to Hotelling’s rule 
with degradation costs5
 
 
?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡)
𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡)𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 
 
(7)  
For the owner of the asset, this implies that extracting a marginal resource now will make 
extracting future resources more expensive. It can be seen from the equation that the in situ 
value will grow with a rate less than the interest. Depending on the cost function it may also 
decrease. 
The central take-away of the Hotelling’s rule is that even with perfectly competitive markets, 
it is natural that prices of exhaustible resources exceed their marginal extraction costs. 
Resource scarcity leads to the existence of a positive scarcity rent, which cannot be 
completely eliminated by trying to make the market more competitive. I will get back to 
market power later. 
Degradation as presented previously applies for identical pools of resources that become more 
expensive and of lower quality during their lifetimes. On an aggregate level however, it can 
be assumed that many resource pools exist simultaneously with different quality or age, and 
thus different extraction costs. It is then economically reasonable to deplete the lowest-cost 
one first and then start sequentially extracting the higher-cost ones (Herfindahl 1967, Solow 
and Wan 1976).  When considering two pools, in situ values of both pools will then grow at 
the rate of interest, but the low-cost one will be more valuable than the high-cost one. Market 
prices remain still same for both, as the extracted end product is assumed homogenous. In this 
case the owner of the high-cost pool will find it profitable to hold on to his resource, until the 
low-cost pool has been depleted. When the low-cost pool is exhausted and the high-cost pool 
starts producing, the extraction costs will instantly jump to the higher level. The in situ value 
has then grown on at a rate less than the interest (Dasgupta and Heal 1979), but the market 
price has kept on continuously growing.  
In oil production, degradation of oil fields is maybe the most central extraction problem of all. 
As described in chapter 2, advanced extraction technology is trying to keep up with degrading 
oil fields. This indeed raises extraction costs significantly as Hotelling's refined rule suggests. 
Testing this version of Hotelling's rule in the oil industry would be very difficult though. 
                                                 
5 For the complete solution see Appendix 1. 
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Extraction costs for most large producers are not public information, the degradation function 
would differ significantly depending on the oil field, and maybe most importantly: there is no 
public consensus on the sizes of initial oil stocks. Testing the theory with rough assumptions 
might be possible as an experiment, but falls out of the scope of this paper.  
Previous concepts offer an explanation for rising oil prices, but do not explain why prices 
have remained stable or even decreased at some long periods of time. This requires further 
expansions of Hotelling’s model. 
3.2.3 Technological change 
Another important issue is technological progress. Extraction technology should develop over 
time making extraction cheaper. By defining the extraction cost as 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 , exogenous 
technological progress will lower extraction costs at the rate α. Hotelling's rule for market 
price growth takes the following form 
 ?̇?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 �1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 − (𝑟𝑟 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) (8)  
where the market price change is the weighted sum of the interest rate and the cost reduction 
achieved from technological progress. When the share of cost is high, the rate of 
technological progress will dominate price movement, but when the share of cost is lower, the 
price will move closer with the interest rate. This would explain a U-shaped price path that 
has been observed with some commodities (Slade 1982).  
As mentioned in chapter 2, oil extraction technology has developed significantly from the 
days of first oil discoveries. New technological methods are developed constantly and the 
newest wells are technically much more advanced than a few decades ago (Simmons 2005). 
This hasn't still stopped the oil price from rising. Combining technological progress with 
significant degradation costs might in theory justify initial price decreases and eventual high 
prices. 
3.2.4 Price paths 
According to equations presented above, prices of exhaustible natural resources should rise 
steadily over time. The price path implied by Hotelling’s theory can be best illustrated by the 
following figure. 
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of a Hotelling’s price path 
As time passes by, the resource is extracted, its stock decreases, and its price increases at a 
speed that is close to the rate of interest. This continues until the backstop price pb
 
 is reached. 
The backstop price represents the price of a substitute for the resource. For oil it can be 
thought as for example the cost per energy unit of switching to an infrastructure of electric 
cars running on nuclear power. After the backstop price is reached, production stops. In the 
end there might be some resources left in the ground, but it is not economical to extract them 
anymore, as the backstop substitute is cheaper. 
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Figure 3.4: Hotelling’s price paths in different cases 
The figures above illustrate the price path in different kinds of cases based on previous 
theoretical concepts. The first figure shows how a higher interest rate causes the stock of 
resources to be exhausted in a shorter time period. The starting level for the price is lower 
because otherwise the backstop price would be reached “too soon”. In the second figure a new 
resource discovery is made after production has already started. It “resets” the price path at 
that time point and a new path is formed based on the total remaining stock and the interest 
rate. In this case the time period for extraction is longer. Further new discoveries would lead 
to a saw-like shape. Besides technological progress, new discoveries are thus also one 
explanation why real life oil prices have not always been rising. The third case presents an 
example of technological change that lowers costs and causes a U-shaped price path as Slade 
(1982) suggests. Basically a series of new resource discoveries and changes in technology 
might explain more realistic looking paths. The last example is a price path of extraction with 
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degradation costs. The price never reaches the backstop as it gets more and more expensive to 
extract the last units of the stock. In this case the supply is so low in the end that consumption 
shifts to using the backstop simultaneously as it is needed to satisfy demand. The shape of the 
path depends on the shape of the cost function. With linear increasing costs the price path will 
be concave as pictured above. Although all of these cases are extreme simplifications of 
reality, they provide good tools to analyzing real life price paths. 
This presentation of Hotelling's important theory was scaled down to suit the scope of this 
paper and thus is just a scratch on the surface. An important extension, namely market 
structure, will be discussed in the next subchapter and revisited again later on with more on 
backstop technologies, but many important aspects of resource economics are left out from 
the theoretical part. Some of the most central ones include uncertainty, investments, 
externalities and taxation.  
Hotelling's rule and the theoretical concepts around it provide necessary tools to 
understanding the basic long-term fundamentals of oil extraction. In the growing world 
economy, with imperfect markets, vast technological advances and political interests it is not 
sufficient to understanding the whole picture. In the following subchapters I will try to get 
deeper into these other affecting issues.  
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3.3 Market power 
The crude oil market does not consist of numerous small and equal producers, as Hotelling’s 
rule would require. Many producers are relatively large and thus at least have the potential to 
use some market power. The Organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) is often 
viewed as the strongest player and accused of manipulating prices and using power as a cartel. 
OPEC itself strongly disagrees with being called a cartel, but does frequently announce 
production quotas, that can be interpreted as cartel agreements. 
 
Figure 3.5: OPEC’s share in reserves and production 2007 (data: IEA 2007) 
Many academics and experts disagree whether OPEC is driving prices higher for their own 
benefit or just stabilizing the market with their capacity (Mitchell 2006). In the following I 
will go through some adjustments to Hotelling’s rule that help to understand how market 
power could change producers’ price paths. I will also discuss more practical evidence behind 
production decisions. 
3.3.1 Hotelling on market structure and imperfect competition 
Hotelling's framework, which was introduced in the previous subchapter, can also be used to 
address imperfect competition. Gaudet (2007) describes the situation where the resource stock 
is owned by a monopolist. To a monopolist the value of the resource stock in ground equals 
its marginal profit on the market, which is less than the in situ value. As the asset markets are 
still required to be in equilibrium, the rate of return of the resource stock must equal the rate 
of interest. The value of the resource stock in ground is now dictated by the rate of change of 
the monopolist's marginal profit, not the rate of change in the in situ value. By assuming 
constant marginal costs, we can get the following equation for the rate of growth in market 
price (Stiglitz 1976) 
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 ?̇?𝑝(𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)� − ?̇?𝜂(𝑡𝑡)𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡) (9)  
where η(t) is the ratio of marginal revenue to price. If costs are assumed negligible, the 
equation becomes simpler.  
The introduction of a monopolist leads to a slower price growth than on a free market, even if 
the ratio of marginal revenue does not change, as the marginal revenue is lower than the price 
and thus the weight of the rate of interest is smaller. This means that even if the elasticity of 
demand remains unchanged, the market price will follow a flatter path than in a competitive 
market, unless marginal extraction costs are insignificant. Another change from the free 
market situation is that the difference between market price and marginal revenue will change 
over time. If 𝜂𝜂 grows over time, the difference will decrease and hence further flatten the 
price path. As the gap between market price and marginal revenue is inversely related to the 
price elasticity of demand, the flattening will happen if elasticity increases over time. An 
elasticity increase would realistically occur on the long run, when substitutes for the resource 
are introduced. (Gaudet 2007) 
 
Figure  3.6: Price path with a monopolist 
The stock of natural resources available for extraction will determine the absolute level of the 
price path. The market equilibrium requires that both the price under free competition and the 
price under monopoly are the same at the date of resource exhaustion. In effect the monopoly 
market price will initially be above the price on the competitive market but eventually become 
below it, assuming that resource stocks are the same. This means that a monopolist will 
exhaust the initial resource stock slower than perfect competition, with a flatter price path. A 
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monopolist may also use his power by choosing a lower initial stock than price-takers, if 
determining the size of the stock is costly (Gaudet and Lasserre 1988). Even in that case, the 
price path will be flatter than under perfect competition. (Gaudet 2007) 
Even though he didn’t formally analyze it, Hotelling himself made the remark, that 
oligopolistic competition is more realistic than a monopoly in most markets for nonrenewable 
resources. The before described price path flattening effect will be present also in an 
oligopoly as it is due to the use of market power in general (Gaudet 2007). Oligopolistic 
competition with nonrenewable resources is however otherwise much more complex than 
either perfect competition or a sole monopolist. It’s a dynamic and strategic game, where 
producers react to each others’ stocks and production choices over time. 
Studying market power and oligopolistic markets in the context of Hotelling’s model was 
largely inspired by the oil crisis of the 1970’s and OPEC’s perceived leading role as a user of 
market power. The usual market description in these studies consists of OPEC as the 
dominant cartel player and of other producers as a competitive fringe. The first of many 
analyses of this problem was made by Salant (1976), in which he used the Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium concept where players ignore their choices’ effects on other players. In this 
equilibrium the competitive fringe takes as given the price path of the dominant player and 
chooses its production accordingly, while the dominant player takes the fringe’s production as 
given and chooses its price path (Gaudet 2007).  
Another branch of studies (for example Gilbert 1978) is also based on the assumption of a 
dominant cartel versus a competitive fringe, but considers the cartel as a Stackelberg leader. 
Now the cartel understands its actions’ impacts on the fringe and takes this into account in its 
decisions. The fringe acts as the follower and chooses its production path based on the 
leader’s production. The cartel acts as the leader and determines its production path by taking 
the fringe’s assumed reaction as given. The important difference here from the Nash-Cournot 
case is that now the cartel can manipulate the fringe’s production decisions. (Gaudet 2007) 
These models have given important tools and points of view to understanding the mechanisms 
of imperfectly competitive markets of non-renewable natural resources. Their limitations, on 
the other hand, have shown that there is still much work to be done for creating an accurate 
model describing all the dynamics of the market. One of the most apparent limitations is that 
both above described oligopoly interpretations are functions of only initial resource stocks 
and time. These are often called “open-loop” strategies and require credible commitment from 
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the players throughout all time to the whole price and output paths. If players do not have 
required capacity to commit to the path, the reached equilibrium may not hold on different 
resource stocks. It may also be that players would change their chosen path if they would be 
allowed to reconsider it at some future time. In terms of game theory, the reached equilibria 
are not generally subgame perfect and may also be time-inconsistent. (Karp and Newberry 
1993, Gaudet 2007) 
Another way to look at the problem is to use so called Markovian strategies, where the 
extraction rate is a function of current, rather than initial reserves. In these strategies 
producers make decisions as time goes by, which leads into feedback equilibria (feedback 
loops, closed-loop equilibria). These are called Markov perfect Nash equilibria as they form a 
Nash equilibrium both in resource stocks on the solution path and resource stocks out of 
equilibrium. Solving these equilibria for a natural resource game is however hard with many 
theoretical and computational issues (Gaudet 2007). Groot et al (2003) have managed to 
derive a Stackelberg feedback equilibrium by setting constant marginal cost and linear 
demand, but much research still remains to be done.  
The situation is easier if we assume that there exists no dominant player, but a limited number 
of equal producers who make simultaneous decisions. This case can be then examined as 
Cournot competition in a dynamic setting, leading to an open-loop game.  It is in many ways 
similar to a static game, because players condition their decisions in the beginning of the 
game. The dynamic nature of its variables makes it still crucially different, even though it is 
an open-loop game. Benchekroun and Gaudet (2003) give an example where production is 
taxed for a finite time period in the game. A static game would change for the period of the 
tax and return to its original state after the tax is lifted. In a dynamic game on the other hand, 
temporary taxes would change the state of the game permanently and players would try to 
anticipate possible effects. This would mean that they change their open-loop paths also 
before and after the taxation period. 
Gaudet (2007) suggests, that because of features as the one described above, open-loop 
strategies are not a good way to analyze depletable natural resource extraction. It is very 
likely that producers gather new information as time goes by and change their production 
accordingly. As with the cartel-fringe structure, a closed-loop Markovian equilibrium is more 
adequate to describe also an oligopoly with equal players. Solving this kind of feedback 
equilibria is comparably difficult as in the case of a cartel and competitive fringe. In contrast 
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to the basic Hotelling’s rule, decisions are not based on the initial situation, but on decision 
rules that are interpreted dynamically. A player knows his own reserves and can observe other 
players’ reserves by assuming that they follow some rule in their production decisions. If 
extraction costs are assumed to be constant, Hotelling’s rule can be sketched as 
 ?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡)
𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠 �𝑋𝑋�⃗ (𝑡𝑡), 𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝑟𝑟 (10)  
where s is the strategic decision function including ?⃗?𝑋(𝑡𝑡), which is the vector of all producers’ 
stocks remaining at a certain time. While the idea of this new formulation is simple, the 
details of the decision rule (function) are unknown. As not even the sign of the component is 
known, no conclusions about its effect on the price path can be made (Gaudet 2007). 
3.3.2 OPEC's role 
As mentioned before, the crude oil market is often said to consist of the cartel OPEC and a 
competitive fringe of other producers, who react based on OPEC’s decisions. While in the 
changing world it is unlikely that OPEC would decide their production on an open-loop basis, 
even complicated feedback equilibria in exhaustible natural resources include the underlying 
feature of increasing in situ value in relation with the interest rate. Strategic decision rules that 
affect production in addition to the interest rate are hard to formalize, but the significance of 
market power used to drive prices can be better understood by looking at evidence from the 
market. 
Since the oil crisis of the 1970’s OPEC has been blamed for rising oil prices. While OPEC 
denies that it is a cartel, it often announces changes in members’ “voluntary production 
restraints”. These quotas represent approximately 45% of current global production and 55% 
of crude oil exports (OPEC 2008) and thus changes in them signal use of market power.  
OPEC’s quota announcements have often been reported widely in the news accompanied by 
political comments and criticism. This has also led to quick movements in crude oil futures’ 
prices anticipating changes in production (Hamilton 2008). The credibility of OPEC’s 
announcements was indisputable in the 1970’s. Also after the price war between OPEC 
members in 1986 coordinated actions were again resumed (Simmons 2005). For 1990’s oil 
prices seemed thus to be negatively correlated with OPEC production. 
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Figure 3.7: OPEC production and WTI oil price (data: EIA 2009) 
After 2002 however, the price trend seems to have lost its connection with OPEC production. 
While small adjustments show negative correlation, the main observation is that even though 
OPEC reached its highest production in decades it was not enough to counter the price 
increase. 
 
Figure 3.8: Quotas and production from selected OPEC members (IEA 2009) 
Hamilton (2008) has studied OPEC’s quota announcements from the past five years. While 
OPEC production numbers are not generally accepted as reliable, he finds that based on third-
party production numbers, quotas are systematically inconsistent with actual production. This 
can be also seen from recent data in the above pictures. Some members overproduce and 
some stay below the quota for long periods. Hamilton (2008) notes that during the five year 
period the causality seemed to be sometimes reversed; production changes happened first and 
it seemed as quotas were just adjusted accordingly. In 2006 OPEC stopped reporting quotas 
as production levels and announced just changes to previous production. 
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Figure 3.9: Saudi Arabian announced reserves and cumulative production 1980 – 2007 (data: 
OPEC 2008) 
We can also question OPEC’s credibility by looking at member countries’ reserve 
announcements. Their proven reserves seem to increase exactly by the amount of production 
annually, as changes in the sizes are almost nonexistent. The above figure shows Saudi 
Arabian announced reserves, which have not changed even though they have simultaneously 
produced significant amounts of them. 
To be able to use market power, OPEC needs two things: excess capacity to stabilize the 
market and internal discipline to limit production. For the past five years, Saudi Arabia has 
been the only OPEC member that has had excess capacity at its usage (Hamilton 2008). It is 
also clearly the largest member, so its production has also impact on the market alone. One 
way of viewing the issue of market power, is to think of Saudi production as the only one 
with power, and regard other producers as competitive. This was mostly the case in the price 
war of 1986. Saudi capacity has been used in many instances to compensate for production 
cuts elsewhere. This has undoubtedly had positive impacts on oil price stability. The Saudis 
did not however manage to stabilize the prices in the past years. There are two reasons that 
could explain why: they could not or they did not want to. I will return to production capacity 
and incentives in later parts of the paper.  
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3.4 Distortions in the exchange 
Understanding Hotelling’s theory and observing the evidence of production and market power 
is not enough for understanding movements in the oil price. Between reaching from producers 
to consumers, oil passes through the marketplace, where many parties with differing interests, 
assumptions and information trade with it and its derivatives. Theory and empirical evidence 
have shown that asset prices can contain bubbles, where the price does not correspond to its 
fundamental value based on supply and demand. Many physical issues also create arbitrage 
possibilities when oil changes owners. Therefore it is important to examine, how oil prices 
could be affected by distortions in the marketplace. 
Figure 3.10: WTI price development in the 21st
Recent changes in oil prices have been often blamed on speculators, who trade on oil futures. 
Oil price was said to be artificially driven up, without justification from fundamental factors. 
The market for oil derivatives has indeed grown significantly in recent years. Oil, as well as 
other commodities, is however different from most securities. Unlike shares, which are held 
for dividend or growth in value, oil is “consumed at the spot” (Hamilton 2008), which means 
that supply and demand are met constantly on the marketplace and once physical oil is sold in 
the spot market, it rarely returns to be sold again. 
 century (data: EIA 2009) 
The exchange in oil is thus constrained by arbitrage conditions in storage and futures markets, 
which are both required to be in equilibrium for arbitrage to be unprofitable. In the following 
I will go through the arbitrage conditions, possible situations when markets could divert from 
them, and empirical evidence about speculators’ actions in the oil market. 
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3.4.1 Storage and futures arbitrage 
If an investor had a view that oil prices were rising strongly, he could borrow money, buy oil 
now, put it into storage, and sell it later with a profit over loan interest. This would require the 
price to be 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 > (1 + 𝑖𝑖)(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) (11)  
where C is the cost of storage and i the interest rate. As investors do not know the future for 
sure, Pt+1 would rather be represented by the price expectation Et Pt+1
 
, which is based on 
current information. If other investors shared the same information and view, everyone would 
start buying oil from the spot and storing it which would increase the spot price. As all oil 
would be going into storage, the expectation of the future price would decrease as there would 
be more oil available in the future. 
Figure 3.11: Storage cost and convenience yield compared to stored amount 
If on the other hand the inequality would be reversed and storage would be clearly 
unprofitable, we might think that there would be no storage at all. This is however not 
completely true as there are also other gains to storage besides price speculation. The so 
called “convenience yield” can be thought as a negative storage cost, and describes the benefit 
of having inventories to balance short term volatility. Inventories are crucial in doing business 
in the oil supply chain. To capture total storage costs/benefits, physical costs, interest costs 
and convenience yield can be simplified into net cost of carry C#. A further refinement to C#
Stored amount
Storage cost Storage 
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could be including risk premia associated in holding inventories. (Hull 2003) 
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Investors balancing between storage decisions create equilibrium, where they need to be 
indifferent between storing and not storing. This can be formulated as 
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶#𝑡𝑡  (12)  
If this equation does not hold, investors will start exploiting the storage arbitrage and the 
market will bring itself back into equilibrium.  
Storing oil is not the only way of profiting from price expectations. An investor could 
alternatively enter a futures contract with another investor, where oil is sold on a future date at 
price Ft
As before, when other investors have the same information and expectations, the market 
balances itself into equilibrium, where investors are indifferent between entering a futures 
contract as a buyer or a seller 
. When such a contract is done through an exchange, both parties have to set aside 
funds as proof that you can fulfill the contract (these are called margin requirements). If the 
investor manages to buy a futures contract with a price that is less than the realized spot price 
in the future (subtracted with costs), he makes a profit. (Hull 2003) 
 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1+𝐻𝐻#𝑡𝑡  (13)  
where H#
Equilibrium in the storage market and the futures market are interrelated and are both required 
to hold simultaneously (Hamilton 2008). An increase in futures prices without an increase in 
the spot price for example, would allow an investor to store oil now and sell it on the futures 
market for a guaranteed profit. Thus, the storage would again continue until equilibrium is 
reached at 
 contains transaction costs, risk premium, and costs related to the marginal 
requirements.  
 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶#𝑡𝑡  (14)  
This result would imply that futures prices are “naturally” somewhat higher than the spot 
price as long as net storage costs are positive. The net storage costs can be negative when 
inventories are low and convenience yield exceeds physical storage costs.  
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Picture 3.12: Equilibrium in contango and backwardation compared to stared amount 
When futures prices exceed the spot price, the market is said to be in contango. The opposite 
of contango is called backwardation, in which the spot price is higher than futures. Because of 
unanticipated changes in oil supply and demand, the oil market shifts between contango and 
backwardation - high inventories and low inventories. This means that the market can be in 
equilibrium both in contango and backwardation, depending on storage levels and associated 
cost and convenience yield. If the equilibrium does not hold at some point of time, the market 
is again balanced as participants exploit the arbitrage to make profits. These short term 
movements are hard to anticipate long beforehand and generally are not seen as drivers for 
larger price trends. (ITF 2008) 
 
Figure 3.13: WTI futures’ term structure (ITF 2008) 
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By looking at the term structure of crude oil futures, we can see that the changes in futures 
prices compared to the spot price are small, when compared to the spot price volatility over 
time.  As the spot price rises, futures prices usually shift accordingly. This relationship has 
been studied extensively and Hamilton (2008) concludes that the spot price Pt is often found 
to be the best forecast for Pt+1
3.4.2 Market bubbles 
. The described arbitrage between oil storage and futures is 
crucial in establishing the link between physical oil prices and prices of financial oil products. 
For this link to work, speculators are needed to provide liquidity and keep the markets in 
equilibrium.  
Previously introduced arbitrage conditions require all participants in the exchange to have 
homogenous information and act on it rationally. Diversion of these requirements or 
introduction of special constraints can lead to the market going out of equilibrium for a period 
of time. A longer disequilibrium, where the price continuously exceeds (or falls short) the 
asset’s fundamental value, is often called a bubble. 
Brunnermeier (2008) classifies market bubbles into four categories:  
1. Bubbles where all investors are rational and have identical information,  
2. Bubbles where investors have asymmetrical information,  
3. Bubbles where rational and behavioral investors interact, and  
4. Bubbles where investors have heterogeneous beliefs or “agree to disagree” 
The first category is mostly theoretical, as constraints for bubbles under identical information 
and rational investors are not easily applicable to practice. In this case, a commonly known 
bubble will grow infinitely, which is possible only for certain assets. This rules out for 
example fossil fuels, as they have a backstop price at which substitutes become cheaper and 
demand drops to zero. (Brunnermeier 2008) 
In the second category, bubble formation is based on asymmetrical information, and the 
existence of a bubble need not to be commonly known. An investor may realize that the value 
of an asset is not justified by its dividends, but he does not know if other investors know this 
as well. These kinds of bubbles also require certain constraints. Investors must remain 
asymmetrically informed also after witnessing asset prices over time. This means that prices 
can not contain all relevant information. For the bubble to persist there has to be also some 
constraints in selling or buying. Also there has to be doubt about the efficiency of the initial 
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allocation, so that investors believe that there can be gains from trade. This kind of a bubble 
might form if a fund manager bought overpriced assets to make his clients believe that he has 
insider information. If other fund managers would not buy as well, it would seem to their 
clients as they had less information. This effect could be further enhanced if fund managers’ 
compensation would not expose them to downside risks as much as upside benefits. 
(Brunnermeier 2008) 
The third category deals with bubbles, which form in a market that has two types of investors: 
rational investors who act based on fundamental valuation, and behavioral investors who are 
affected by psychological motives. In an efficient market, the rational investors would exploit 
the arbitrage and stop a psychologically motivated bubble from forming. There are however 
many realistic risks to arbitrage, which allow a bubble to form. Fundamental risk aversion 
limits selling against the bubble, as there might be a simultaneous shift in the fundamentals 
towards the bubble leading to a larger loss than doing nothing. Another risk arises from noise 
traders, who may temporarily widen the mispricing. This is especially risky for fund 
managers, who have to be concerned also on short-run losses, as they may lead to fund 
outflows. This limits their willingness to attack bubbles. This is also why many arbitrage-
based hedge-funds have lock-up provisions to stop fund owners from selling after short run 
losses. The third and maybe the most interesting arbitrage limiting risk associated to this case 
of bubbles is the synchronization risk. Investors gather and interpret information in search for 
bubbles and arbitrage opportunities. The process is however not completely identical, which 
leads to investors becoming aware of bubbles not simultaneously, but sequentially. Investors 
do not know if other investors are aware of the bubble and they have no means to credibly 
communicate about it. If none of the investors is large enough to attack the bubble alone, the 
only way to burst the bubble would be a coordinated attack. Thus, without coordination 
investors choose to “ride the bubble” as it is more profitable than attacking it alone. This can 
be also seen as one reason why seemingly insignificant news trigger large movements in asset 
prices: Investors take the news as a synchronization signal that they know others will 
recognize as well, and start trading against the mispricing. The same can be thought to apply 
for technical analysis. (Brunnermeier 2008)  
The fourth category of bubbles form when there are heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental 
valuation. Investors agree to disagree about the pricing even though they have access to 
identical information. If short-selling constraints are introduced, bubbles may form as 
optimists drive prices up but pessimists cannot counterbalance them. In a dynamic setting, 
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prices can rise even over the valuation of the most optimistic investor, if optimism and 
pessimism is assumed to shift between investors. According to a study by Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003), short-selling constraints and investors with heterogeneous beliefs lead to high 
trading volumes and high volatility. (Brunnermeier 2008) 
In his recent paper, Jovanovic (2007) presented a bubble that applies directly to the 
Hotelling’s model. He used the example of high-end vintage wines, which behave like non-
renewable resources. Jovanovic suggests that the market for wines can be in equilibrium 
while a price bubble sustained and some fraction of the stock continues to be traded infinitely 
while consumption is low. In the oil market however consumption is relatively high compared 
to storage and oil in the ground is not traded back and forth. The theory might still be more 
relevant when closer to the moment of resource exhaustion. 
Bubble formation has been studied with empirical data and laboratory tests. Using real market 
data has not given conclusive answers. Rejecting the hypothesis that a bubble exists has been 
as hard as proving that one does not exist. Experiments in controlled laboratory environment 
however, have revealed much about bubble formation. Results with human test subjects differ 
strongly from theoretical predictions. Test subjects participate in trading actively, even if 
there is no fundamental reason or information asymmetry. Bubbles emerge even in tests with 
business professionals as subjects who are allowed short-selling. Only a futures market and 
repeated tests reduce observed bubble formation. These test results support the view that even 
experienced people are not always rational investors and do not actually rely on backward 
induction in decision making. The practical implication from this is that also real markets are 
likely to experience bubbles. (Brunnermeier 2008) 
In the case of oil prices a price bubble has often been suspected. However, we should note 
that oil has no dividend streams, and does not generally return to the market to be resold. In 
this sense the concept of a bubble is valid only to those who do not take part in the production 
or refining of physical oil, namely speculators and arbitragers who invest in futures or 
physical storage. Thus a bubble would be formed between futures prices and the spot price. 
The oil market indeed seems to share many characteristics with the before mentioned bubble 
models. Information about fundamental oil drivers, such as capacity and production costs, is 
not reliably available, and is further made more complicated by political decisions and 
sometimes unpredictable use of market power. As all information is not available, many 
explanations about oil prices have formed, and they coexist amongst the market participants. 
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In this sense many oil investors agree to disagree about fundamental valuation. Especially in 
the past few years, the oil market has seen increasing volumes and large volatility, which also 
fit the theoretical prediction of a heterogeneous belief bubble.  
As mentioned before however, the oil market is constrained at the spot by physical 
limitations: If the spot price included a bubble and actual demand would be lowered, oil 
storage should increase accordingly. On the other hand the oil futures market makes it 
possible for speculators to take positions in oil even though they never take part in physical 
delivery. It is thus often suggested that speculators could sustain an intentional bubble by 
using futures contracts. This argument contradicts with the arbitrage linkage of futures and 
storage that was presented earlier. Transferring the bubble to the spot price would still have to 
change inventory levels in most cases. I will look into evidence of this kind of speculation in 
the following subchapter. 
3.4.3 Evidence of speculation 
Speculators in the oil market are investors who do not do business with physical oil. They 
only care about changes in the value of oil-derived securities in comparison with their 
holdings. The amount of speculators in the oil market has risen significantly in the 21st 
century. The increase was largely due to the increase in index trading. Index traders diversify 
their holdings into different asset classes, oil being one amongst many. They are generally 
always in a long position and expect prices to rise or they exit the market. According to 
Masters (2008), assets in funds investing in commodity index trading strategies have risen 
from $13 billion at the end of 2003 to $260 billion on March 2008. These strategies are 
executed by holding near-term futures contracts and selling them before their expiry date. The 
revenue is then used to buy new futures from the following month, and the strategy continues. 
This is sometimes called “rolling futures contracts”. 
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Figure 3.14: WTI contracts open interest compared to prices at NYMEX 2002 – 2008 (data: 
Masters 2008, BP 2008) 
While index traders are in long positions, there has to be always an equal amount of short 
positions from other market participants, as the futures market is a zero-sum-game. If rising 
volumes on the buy side would drive futures prices up against fundamentals, there would be 
many sellers benefitting from the situation when storage arbitrage delivers profits and the 
bubble bursts. As with bubble theories in the previous subchapter however, this kind of a 
situation could last for some time as arbitrage may be limited by risk aversion and uncertainty 
about information. A positive bubble in futures prices should still not lead to an increase in 
spot prices, but an increase in oil storage. Borenstein (2008) calculates that a 30% increase in 
oil prices would require storing 3% of global oil supply. There is no evidence of this so far. It 
is still good to note that only a fraction of global oil inventories are reported publicly. 
According to Hamilton (2008), there is a case in which a futures bubble could lead to spot 
price increases with no clear storage effects. This would be, if the spot price was completely 
price inelastic in the short run. Then an increase in the futures price would increase the spot 
price with the exact same amount. This would indeed make “rolling futures contracts” 
profitable as an investment and lead to an expanding bubble. In the theoretical situation of 
zero price elasticity however, the concept of a bubble does not make much sense. When 
higher prices do not affect demand, then the high price is the price that makes supply and 
demand match and the market is thus in equilibrium. I will return to the price elasticity of oil 
demand in the following subchapter, but it is good to consider that while elasticity is unlikely 
to be zero, very low elasticity may lead to inventories accumulating slower and arbitrage to be 
less efficient. 
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In a report by the Cabinet Office of the United Kingdom government (2008), another 
mechanism is suggested for transferring futures bubbles to the spot market. The report states 
that in tight market conditions it might be possible to drive prices higher by only having the 
possibility to store oil. The logic is that existing storage capacity would allow the seller to 
effectively use negotiating power in a situation where market prices are expected to rise, 
without ever having to actually use the capacity and increase storage. While there is no 
evidence supplied about this mechanism, it sounds theoretically plausible to some extent. 
The role of speculation in oil prices has been studied by many market organizations, most 
notably recently the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) of the US government, 
who monitors derivatives trade at NYMEX and other exchanges alike. The CFTC gathered a 
task force (Interagency Task Force, ITF) from different US government market regulation and 
energy agencies and assigned them to study speculation on the crude oil market. The ITF 
released an interim report of their findings in July 2008, before the price collapse of the same 
fall. 
The report also underlines the fact that the amount open futures positions have significantly 
grown during the past years. Most of the growth has been due to activities by non-commercial 
market participants. Open interests of producers and manufacturers have not grown notably in 
the same time period. However, according to the report, the net long position of speculators 
relative to the market volume has remained steady. This could be interpreted as speculative 
positions being “natural” in this kind of growth. Also, most of the growth by speculators has 
been exhibited in spread positions, which take views on relative prices, not absolute price 
levels. As noted before, if the oil market would continuously divert upwards from its spot 
market equilibrium, there should be evidence of inventory accumulation. During the strong 
price growth of the past five years, inventory levels have however declined instead (ITF 
2008). 
The ITF report goes further and utilizes causality test, to study if position changes of different 
groups of market participants have preceded or succeeded price changes. This is done in order 
to find out if different investors indeed succeed in manipulating the price by their behavior, or 
take price changes as new information and adjust accordingly, as we would expect from a 
functioning market. 
While non-commercial traders (or speculators), have correlated positively with prices, it does 
not prove that the direction of the causality. The causality tests do not show any significant 
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results of position changes leading to price changes. Most groups of market participants 
however show significant signs of changing their position after price changes. Commercial 
participants seem to move towards the price change. Hedge Funds, maybe the most known 
speculators, on the other hand move significantly against price changes, as we might expect 
from an active arbitrager. 
The report concludes that the price increases in the past five years are due to fundamental 
factors such as demand and supply developments, currency movements and market structure. 
According to the report, the fundamental price increase has increased interest in oil futures, 
thus explaining the significant volume increases. The role of speculative price manipulation is 
dismissed in the light of causality test results, but because of some limitations in the data and 
tested causalities speculation cannot be completely ruled out. 
Recent price drops in the oil market have changed the picture a lot. Unfortunately the ITF 
(2008) report hasn’t been followed up with positions and causalities in the price crash. Public 
evidence so far does not indicate that funds or financial institutions would have benefitted 
from the crash. The observation that no one generally benefitted from the crash, does not 
necessarily mean that there was no bubble. It merely suggests that if there was a bubble, it 
burst unpredictably and not by a successful attack by the speculators. It could also be possible 
that there was an unintended bubble element in the price resulting from heterogeneous beliefs 
as mentioned earlier. The price crash may have also been somewhat exaggerated because of 
forced selling of all asset classes, including oil derivatives, by many investors in search for 
liquidity.  
In the light of current evidence we cannot conclude that the price increase and subsequent 
crash of the past five years would have been mainly a result of a speculation in oil prices. 
Positions in the futures markets and especially oil inventory changes do not support a bubble 
explanation. The possibility of extremely low price elasticity combined with storage owners’ 
successful bargaining still remains and may have had some effect. As I will further describe in 
the following subchapters, the price changes were more likely mostly result of fundamental 
issues that were at least temporarily solved by the bursting of another bubble, namely in the 
private loan markets.  
  
57 
 
3.5 Short run equilibrium and inelasticity 
Recently some academic and industrial sources (for ex. Hamilton 2008, IEA 2008) have 
suggested that the recent price increase and the even faster crash were not primarily results of 
producers’ use of market power nor speculators’ distortion in commodity exchanges. Instead 
price changes are explained to a large extent by the unique characteristics of the oil market, 
which derive from supply and demand fundamentals. As we have seen, even as prices 
increased almost four fold, demand did not decrease significantly, but also there were not 
large production increases either (EIA 2009). This sort of inelasticity in both supply and 
demand allow severe price volatility, while the market is in principle functioning well. I will 
go through aspects of the oil market that lead to its short run inelasticity. 
3.5.1 Production capacity 
If oil demand for some reason increases, or there is some external factor that requires 
production to grow, it would be natural to expect that producers increase production to match 
the demand. Lead times in new oil projects are however very long. It takes years for initial 
discoveries to be developed into producing oil fields. This means that on the short term, 
producers can only increase their production within the limits of existing capacity. With the 
high prices of recent years however, most producers seemed to have practically zero excess 
capacity left. 
Many sources (for example IEA 2007) divide global oil production capacity to non-OPEC 
countries who are expected to meet demand as well as they can, and to OPEC countries who 
decide how much of their capacity they use to achieve a desired global price level. The part of 
demand that cannot be matched by non-OPEC countries is called “call on OPEC”. The used 
term already reveals an underlying assumption that OPEC countries would have excess 
capacity available. 
Until the recent price crash, excess capacity all over the world had been diminishing for many 
years. As I noted before with OPEC, Saudi Arabia has long been the only country with 
potential to quickly increase production significantly. In practice all increases in the “call on 
OPEC” were to be compensated by the Saudis if prices were to be kept stable. The Saudis 
have often voiced that they are committed to keep oil prices on a reasonable level (OPEC 
2008), but as prices continued to rise it started to look like even the Saudis had no more 
capacity available to balance the market. This led to more and more expensive capacity to be 
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taken into use, which contributed to higher prices. It would have been interesting to see how 
the situation would have continued in the following years, if the economic downturn had not 
taken the prices down. 
The highest observed prices of year 2008 need not to be completely explained by production 
costs. In the event of a supply crunch, where production fails to match inelastic demand, 
prices can rise high as explained earlier. In that situation the temporal scarcity increases the 
price easily above any marginal costs as buyers are bidding for the limited supply of oil. If 
such situation persists however, substitution and arbitrage based on increasing production in 
the future should balance the market.  
There are many explanations to why production capacity was unable to keep up with the 
growing demand in the past years, and I will look into them in the next subchapter with long-
term prospects. 
While increasing production to meet increasing demand has been hard, decreasing should 
always be easier. Recent evidence (EIA 2009) however suggests that oil is accumulating in 
storage as crude oil production significantly exceeds shrunken down demand. The reason why 
production is not being turned down is probably not related to technical issues, but to national 
budgets and politics. The public spending of many oil exporting countries is dependent on oil 
incomes. During the recent years national budgets were planned based on high oil prices. The 
increased income allowed many countries to expand their public sector, demonstrate military 
strength and gain regional influence.  
Table 3.1: Oil prices that would balance exporters’ national budgets in 2009 (Data: IEA 2009) 
Country Oil price, $ 
Venezuela 97 
Nigeria 71 
Russia 70 
Saudi Arabia 62 
Iran 58 
UAE 51 
Kuwait 48 
Algeria 35 
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As prices have dropped, these countries need to sell as much oil as possible to get even close 
to their budget goals. Discounting possible higher prices in the future is not political reality 
because decision makers face domestic short term obligations, such as public sector wages 
and import payments. At uncertain economic times discount rates are higher thus also 
practically favoring producing rather now than later. As long as the oil price does not drop 
below their marginal costs, it is not in any exporter’s interest to unilaterally decrease 
production. So far OPEC has not been able to coordinate any significant decreases since the 
price drops. In a way the situation corresponds to a classical prisoner’s dilemma, where non-
compliance to OPEC agreements would yield significant short-term gains. 
At the time of writing, OPEC has announced large production cuts and there are some reports 
based on tanker movements that indicate actual significant decreases in OPEC production. 
The ability of turning prices back to an upward trend may well turn out to be the best 
evidence of OPEC’s current market power, or the lack of it. This paper however will not 
reach long enough to see the results. 
3.5.2 Demand reactions 
As mentioned in chapter 2, transportation makes up over 50% of global oil demand. In the 
short term, there are practically no substitutes for oil in transportation. Individuals use 
transportation for many purposes, none of which they easily give up. Commuting and daily 
tasks account for most of the individual oil spending, but in the developed countries also 
leisure activities have a fair share. The share of oil expenditures in total income is however 
not large in the western world, and has been diminishing over past decades (EIA 2008). As oil 
prices went up, private consumption remained almost unchanged. While some people were 
thinking about reducing consumption, they had made many commitments to oil. Buying a 
smaller car, moving closer to the workplace or rearranging leisure activities and holidays can 
all be done, but are not worth the saving for everyone, and do not happen very quickly 
anyway. In many developed countries, such as EU members, retail oil products are also taxed 
so heavily, that changes in crude oil prices do not have the same magnitude on consumers as 
they have on the crude oil market.  
In developing countries oil prices would have struck harder as the income share of oil is also 
higher. It is important to note however, that in many developing countries oil prices are 
subsidized by the government. This is true especially for China, which was the leader of the 
demand increase of the past decade. Governments of course paid (at least in the form of 
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alternative income) for the subsidies, but they were not lowered even with high prices (EIA 
2008), as cheap oil was seen as a crucial ingredient for economic growth and the investment 
in subsidies would thus pay off.  
Transportation for commercial purposes felt the increase in prices heavily, as fuel costs are 
very significant for the transportation industry. Many companies faced financial difficulties, 
but a large part of the risen fuel costs were transferred to transport prices. This then became a 
burden for consumers in the form of higher prices for food and some other goods (EIA 2008). 
While the transportation industry reacted to the rising oil prices, it did not directly lead to less 
demand. 
As described earlier, the other large oil consuming sector is industry, with an over 30% share 
of the world oil demand. Oil price increases of recent years hit the industry as well. Rising 
costs were transferred to prices to a large extent, thus again delaying price reactions. Unlike 
with transportation, many industrial processes can technically substitute oil for natural gas or 
even coal. Still it requires investments and long lead times. Also as with consumer incomes, 
oil costs are not a significant factor in many industrial companies. 
The recent oil price crash was triggered by a sudden decrease in demand caused by a global 
economic downturn. Market evidence shows that the spot demand has (EIA 2009) decreased 
significantly. As this shock is exogenous from the perspective of the oil market and affects the 
whole economy, it is hard to separate price elasticity effects from demand decreases caused 
by crisis. While oil is now cheaper than in 2004, demand is not increasing, because demands 
for goods that oil is used for or transported with are expected to decrease as well as demand 
for personal transport. It will be interesting to see, how the economic crisis affects oil demand 
in the coming years. I will return to demand growth on the longer term in the next subchapter. 
3.5.3 Empirical observations of short run elasticity 
Elasticities are hard to determine empirically, as the only observation is the equilibrium price 
at a given time. Separating factors behind changes in both supply and demand is practically an 
impossible task. Some unique global events however allow economists to reveal price 
movements that can be considered resulting from an isolated factor. Hamilton (2008) takes an 
example from the turn of the 1980’s, when first the Iranian and then Iraqi oil production 
dropped heavily due to the Iranian revolution and the following Iran-Iraq war as described in 
chapter 3.1. This led to a logarithmic oil price increase of 81,1% and a decrease in US oil 
61 
 
consumption by 16,0% while the US GDP increased by 5,4% at the same time. From these 
figures, a short run demand price elasticity of -0,26 can be estimated.  
In the 21st
Low price elasticity makes prices very volatile to any changes in the market equilibrium. 
Events like the current global economic crisis change demand and the price has to change 
sometimes extremely to stabilize the market. The same kinds of effects were seen for example 
when King Faisal used the “oil sword”, decreased supply, and sent oil prices soaring as 
described in the history part. If demand stays inelastic for many years, prices can rise 
relatively quickly also without any surprising global events, as we saw during the past five 
years. 
 century, before the recent crash, oil prices increased much over 100% but the US 
oil consumption actually increased as well. While it is hard to say any numbers, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the short run price elasticity of demand is now even less than in the 
1980’s. This has been also suggested by other sources. A study by Hughes, Knittel and 
Sperling (2008) on US gasoline prices estimates, that while short run elasticity of demand was 
around -0,21 – -0,34 between 1975 and 1980, it was only -0,034 – -0,077 between 2001 and 
2006. 
When looking at a longer period of time, demand becomes more elastic, as consumers and 
industries adjust their consumption and seek for alternative sources of energy and raw 
materials. Supply also responds as new investments come on line, and producers plan for 
coming generations according to Hotelling’s principle. In the next subchapter I will look into 
the market equilibrium in the long run.  
62 
 
3.6 Long run equilibrium and dependence 
We might argue that the price changes we’ve seen in the past five years are natural 
consequences of an (albeit strong) economic cycle. The inelastic nature of the oil market just 
caused it to react to the cycle rather violently. 
On the long run the market becomes more elastic but also new constraints come into play. 
Large scale substitution and physical limits of oil reserves shape the long run price path. In 
this chapter I will look into longer term supply and demand drivers to better understand where 
the market might be heading. 
3.6.1 Supply development 
From the beginning of the oil industry up until the turn of the millennia, oil production has 
been able to keep up with increasing oil demand. Many oil fields have dried down, even many 
oil producing countries have seen their aggregate production turning into decline, but on a 
global scale new relatively cheap reserves have always been found to compensate declines 
elsewhere. During the price increase of the past five years however, it seemed that all 
production capacity was at use.  
It is important to note here that producing at full capacity is often damaging to the oil field, as 
mentioned earlier in the market description. Overproducing may lead to unwanted movements 
of water inside the well and lead to lower amount of oil ultimately recovered. In this sense 
long term capacity should not be seen as the amount of built wells pumping at full speed, but 
as the rate that is sustainable for a long period of time and maximizes ultimate recovery.  
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Figure 3.15: Developed oil producer’s production decline (data: IEA 2007) 
As mentioned, many countries’ production has turned to decline. This has been especially true 
for developed economies, maybe because oil has been searched and found there early. The 
production in United States reached its highest point already in 1970. Reserves in the North 
Sea reached their production highs in 1999 and 2000 for the United Kingdom and Norway, 
respectively. Production in Middle East has been able to increase so far, but its sustainability 
is a big question. Simmons (2005) has studied Saudi Arabian oil fields extensively and 
concludes that production is likely to turn into a decline very soon, if it has not already 
happened. Indeed, during the high prices of past years Saudis didn’t manage to increase their 
production, but it in fact decreased for some periods. Simmons also suggests that oil reserve 
sizes in the Middle East are significantly exaggerated. 
Reserves, as well as production rates to some extent, are also a matter of price. With high oil 
prices it is economical to take some new reserves into production, which would not have been 
profitable before. New production is coming on line all the time, but the question is if it 
comes fast enough to keep up with growing demand. 
After oil fields reach their highest production, they start to decline, at a relatively stable rate. 
These decline rates are usually observed at around 6% to 8% per year (IEA 2007). The 
observed decline however includes continuous investments to keep pressure up and purify the 
degrading oil. The International Energy Agency (2007) estimates that natural decline rates, 
with no investments to new technology are on average 10%. 
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Table 3.2: Oil investment projects coming on line in the next 10 years (data: Oil megaprojects 
2009) 
(thousands of 
barrels per day) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total 
OPEC 
           
  
Saudi Arabia 1150 670 365 300 330 250 
     
3065 
Angola 130 
 
335 395 525 140 
     
1525 
Iran 115 95 255 210 
 
530 240 
    
1445 
Nigeria 205 240 459 250 150 
      
1304 
Qatar 505 280 170 135 
       
1090 
Iraq 60 200 150 
 
200 
      
610 
UAE 20 210 75 
   
200 
    
505 
Algeria 100 50 190 40 
       
380 
Venezuela 75 
 
200 
        
275 
Other OPEC 105 
 
175 110 190 
      
580 
            
  
Non-OPEC 
           
  
Canada 100 215 125 300 185 350 210 245 162 180 50 2122 
Brazil 200 460 280 200 380 300 100 
    
1920 
Russia 570 310 415 360 15 
      
1670 
Kazakhstan 
   
300 380 
  
850 
   
1530 
USA 335 180 110 120 
 
150 200 
    
1095 
Norway 100 190 85 125 
       
500 
China 
  
20 200 80 
      
300 
Mexico 173 
 
51 74 
       
298 
Other Non-
OPEC 402 560 275 140 110 100 305 
    
1892 
                          
World total 4345 3660 3735 3259 2545 1820 1255 1095 162 180 50 22106 
 
The above table is from an open source project that tracks oil investment plans around the 
world. As the table shows, there are many large ongoing investment projects to new oil 
production capacity. With the above table and a rough decline estimate of 5% we can 
calculate that global capacity will start declining after three years. Thus new capacity will be 
coming on line in future years to at least partly offset declining current capacity and to answer 
to the eventually growing demand, but it is hard to anticipate, if current investment rate will 
continue fast enough in the future with new projects. Current uncertainty about price and 
demand development has stalled many projects, and the investment environment has at least 
temporarily deteriorated significantly (EIA 2009). The figure below further illustrates this 
issue by comparing the planned capacity upgrades with the EIA (2009) long term demand 
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forecast. The forecast takes the current economic slowdown into account and we can see that 
there is a large gap that needs to be filled with future investments. 
Figure 3.16: New oil projects are replacing old capacity and trying to meet growing demand 
(data: Oil megaprojects, IEA 2009) 
As mentioned in previous chapters, more recent oil field discoveries have been in difficult 
locations and of lower quality. This means that extraction costs for new oil fields are 
generally higher than for older ones in for example Middle East and Texas. Average and 
marginal extraction costs are trade secrets of oil companies, but many cost estimates exist. It 
is generally accepted that producers in the Middle East have the lowest production costs. 
Marginal producers’ cost estimates with current production range from $50 to $90 per barrel 
depending on the source and level (for ex. IEA 2007). For the oil price, only marginal 
producers matter, as they will set the fundamental price level. 
The current situation might work as a reference for figuring out marginal costs. In January 
2009, the prices of WTI and Brent have stabilized to around $40 to $45, with production and 
demand somewhat less than a year before. As financial asset markets around the world have 
crashed, accusations of speculative price bubbles have disappeared. It is reasonable to assume 
that price is at least close to supply/demand fundamentals. This is not necessarily 
contradicting previously mentioned higher marginal costs, as production has decreased, and 
inventories are currently much higher (actually at record highs, EIA 2009) than at the time 
those estimates were made. From this we can make an educated guess that we are in a part of 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
Old Capacity (5% decline after 2008) New Planned Capacity IEA Demand forecast
66 
 
the supply curve where it quickly gets steeper. As discussed in the previous part, the 
steepening may be really rapid on the short run, if inventories are low and there is not much 
excess capacity available. 
 
Figure 3.17: Hypothetical oil supply curve 
The figure above sketches the marginal cost structure of oil production based on current 
existing and planned capacity. It divides production into a few categories based on marginal 
costs. It also visualizes that there is undoubtedly much more oil left to be produced (even 
much more than the figure shows), but it will get increasingly expensive. Additionally, as 
cheap oil fields are already in a mature phase and newer fields are more expensive, the supply 
curve will start moving to the left as the leftmost parts get smaller. This will shift the 
equilibrium to a steeper part on the curve, which then leads to higher prices. An additional 
issue with more expensive unconventional sources is that while their reserves are plentiful, 
the achieved production rates per reserves are low because of required time consuming 
processing (Simmons 2005). 
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Figure 3.18: Guessing a supply curve based on historical price/production (data: EIA 2009) 
One way of trying to guess a supply curve is plotting historical prices against historical 
production-figures as is done in the above figure. While this is not econometrically sound 
method, it gives some hints on the curve. If we forget all other factors for a moment and look 
at the figure, it seems as the first 83 million barrels per day are relatively cheap to produce, 
but it gets quickly much more expensive after that. Of course there are many things between 
production and eventual prices as described before and on the long run the market will 
become more elastic.  
Grim analyses of the future of oil supply were much more popular when the prices were high. 
Still, unless long-term demand growth decreases, new cheap oil fields are found, extraction 
technology is significantly developed or cheap substitutes arrive, we will likely see high oil 
prices in the future as well. 
3.6.2 Demand development 
On the long run, oil demand is largely driven by the same drivers as economic growth in 
general. The basis of long term oil demand forecasts is thus in GDP and population growth. 
As mentioned in the second chapter however, oil intensity of GDP tends to fall as countries 
get more developed. This is through increased efficiency in industry and reduction of relative 
transportation spending.  
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Figure 3.19: Oil consumption growth rates from 1995 to 2008 (data: EIA 2009) 
As the above figure shows, demand growth has been relatively low in OECD countries with 
Japan as an example of significant demand reductions. Developing countries on the other 
hand are still on a strong growth track with China as the extreme example increasing oil 
demand almost 130% in 13 years.  
The EIA (2008) estimates that global oil demand will grow on an annual rate of 1,2% until 
2030. Their estimate for total energy demand growth in the same period is 1,6%, which means 
that the relative share of oil will drop. This is explained by industry switching to relatively 
cheaper coal and natural gas, whose demand is forecasted to grow more than the average 
(these commodities also have same kind of constraints as oil, but the dynamic relationship 
falls beyond the scope of this paper). This shift has already been happening gradually for 
some time and shows that on a longer run the industrial demand is indeed rather price elastic. 
The key issue of oil demand also in the coming decades will be transportation. Even though 
not as inelastic as in the short run, forecasts (IEA 2007, EIA 2008) do not see transportation 
declining significantly even with sustained periods of high prices. As mentioned several times 
before, unlike the industrial sector, transportation does not have easy substitutes in sight. Also 
subsidies in many developing countries distort the price impact on consumers, thus making 
the price more inelastic. If oil prices increase back to last year’s levels for a longer period of 
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time, subsidies will become expensive to sustain and also demand will start reacting to the 
price.  
Figure 3.20: Billions of miles travelled monthly on US highways 1983 – 2008 (data: US 
department of transportation 2009) 
The above figure is a good example of eventual elasticity in transportation. Although the very 
last portions of the curve were probably more affected by the economic slowdown, high oil 
prices were undoubtedly a factor in decreasing driving growth that had grown steadily for at 
least twenty five years. Despite some elasticity, it is clear that the whole global transportation 
system is dependent on oil on almost all levels. The only way to ease the situation is to find 
efficient and economical substitutes. 
3.6.3 Substitutes 
As mentioned above, industry has many substitutes for oil. Plastics and chemicals can be 
made from natural gas or even coal. Other industrial processes use oil for creating heat, which 
can be done with even a larger variety of substitutes. The transportation segment on the other 
hand does not have the flexibility, but substitution in other industries makes more oil 
available for transportation at lower prices (Mitchell 2006). 
Oil will eventually be substituted in transportation as well. The question is if it will happen 
because future high prices make current substitutes desirable or because of breakthroughs in 
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technology that make substitutes competitive also with current lower prices. Oil dependence 
in transportation can be divided into two issues. The first one is the direct dependence on oil 
as the fuel for internal combustion engines. It requires liquid oil-based fuel available around 
the world. It also makes Western economies dependent on the Middle East and other oil 
exporters. Development of electric engines running on a battery or hydrogen presents a 
possibility to break free from this dependence. Batteries can be charged or hydrogen produced 
with electricity, which can then be produced in many ways. 
This is where the second dependence issue arises: even if we managed to make transportation 
directly independent of oil as a fuel, we still need to produce the energy somehow. Using 
other depletable resources such as natural gas or coal would just move the same long-term 
problems between similar commodities. Also producing electricity from fossil fuels centrally 
does not necessarily provide better efficiency than individual engines. In the case of hydrogen 
cars it actually reduces energy efficiency (EIA 2008). Other forms of electricity generation, 
such as nuclear power, hydro power or wind power are either physically constrained, more 
expensive, or both and thus cannot substitute for oil with current prices and technology. 
Because transportation is truly addicted on oil, many policy efforts have aimed at reducing the 
dependency gradually. Subsidies on biofuels production have increased fuels’ supply with 
more neutral environmental effects. Biofuels are still a very controversial solution as they 
compete for the same agricultural land with food production. Another solution, and the most 
reasonable for many reasons, is increasing the efficiency of transportation. Fuel efficiency has 
large variations between countries and is not necessarily correlated with standards of living. 
Cars in the United States consume on average almost double the fuel per kilometer as cars in 
Italy do (IEA 2007). This is a good example of significant efficiency gains that could be 
achieved by regulation without new innovations or costs. Consumer attitudes play also a large 
role here. With high oil prices in the past few years, fuel efficiency and electric vehicles 
gained much public interest. Hybrid vehicles gave an example of fuel efficiency that was 
economically sound, and while still running on oil they contributed to research for less direct 
dependence in the future. With the current economic crisis and cheap oil, talks about new 
(expensive) car innovations have faded to the background. There is a vicious circle: Without 
necessary changes in oil consumption structure we cannot restrain demand growth and 
achieve lower prices in the long run, but without high prices there might not be enough 
political momentum to get the changes going. 
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The mentioned challenges are real and large, but not unimaginable. One of the biggest 
problems in the vision of oil independent transportation is its adaptation in the developing 
world. While a population of electric cars running on centrally produced fusion power is a 
possible scenario in OECD-countries during this century, it feels very hard to imagine in the 
developing world. Changes like these take a very long time and during that time we may hit 
many new oil price spikes with their adverse side effects. 
3.6.4 Producers’ incentives  
With the previous subchapters in mind, it is worth to think about the issues from the 
producers’ point of view. As they are fully aware of the challenges involved, we should 
assume that their long term behavior is somehow affected. As we saw in an earlier part of this 
paper, fully competitive markets for exhaustible resources should already lead to increasing 
prices based on the Hotelling’s rule. The use of market power leads to different price levels 
and time-frames but does not change the main idea.  
According to Hotelling’s rule, supply decisions are made by maximizing the present value of 
all future oil incomes taking into account alternative investments. This requires rationality and 
a time-frame lasting the whole life of the reserves. In reality decisions are affected by shorter 
term issues, which are often also of political nature as most reserves are controlled by 
governments. Corrupt politicians may maximize oil incomes for the current regime, or use oil 
to gain political power. This can range from gaining personal influence to practicing 
international extortion. Even honest politicians face challenges trying to balance trade 
accounts and national budgets as noted before.  
It is unlikely that real world decision makers operate in a time-frame spanning over several 
generations and discount their wellbeing fairly. This is especially unsettling for many 
developing countries, whose economies are dependent on oil incomes. Being short-sighted 
could seriously harm the future generations. If decision makers do not consider future 
generations to be equal, they choose a higher discount rate for their Hotelling price paths. 
This leads to resources being exhausted faster, as seen in chapter 3.3.  
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Figure 3.21: Saudi Arabia’s population and reserves/capita (data: IEA 2007, IMF 2009) 
Many developing oil exporting countries have experienced a population-boom alongside the 
oil-boom. In Saudi Arabia the purchasing power corrected GDP/capita has actually decreased 
during the past 20 years. Worries about future generations are thus clearly justified. In April 
2008, According to the official Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah was 
quoted saying: “I keep no secret from you that when there were some new finds, I told them, 
‘no, leave it in the ground, with grace from god, our children need it.” It may be that the 
events of the past five years were the first real global example of inevitable limits in oil 
production, and that producers are finally starting to take Hotelling’s rule and eventual 
scarcity into account. On the other hand comments like these can be also political rhetoric 
with no real message. It will be interesting to see how the OPEC countries and especially 
Saudi Arabia will produce in the coming years.  
One observation raises concerns of producers’ different views of the world: reserves to 
production -ratios differ significantly between producers. Russia and Saudi-Arabia both 
produce approximately at the same rate, but according to their reporting Russia’s proven oil 
reserves are less than half of Saudi-Arabia’s (OPEC 2008). 
Differing reserves/production ratios can be seen as results of different geopolitical aspirations, 
or just the undisputable dominance of Middle East. Still, also other possible conclusions can 
be drawn. The exhaustion rate can be seen as an indicator of the producer’s view of the time 
crude oil has left as the world’s dominant commodity. Saudis will exhaust their resources in 
almost 80 years at current speed, as Russia will spend less than 40 years, and the United 
States only 11 years (OPEC 2008). These numbers do not take into account oil field declines 
or discount factors, but still illustrate either differing strategies or short term thinking. 
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In a forthcoming paper Gerlagh and Liski (2008) present a theory that leads to a price path 
different from Hotelling. They describe a situation where a powerful seller and a dependent 
buyer bargain for a scarce resource. The buyer would like to switch to an abundant backstop 
resource, but the irreversible transition requires an investment and takes time to complete. 
Unlike the Hotelling’s case, where resource supplies decrease as the price closes to the 
backstop, this situation makes the producers increase supplies and thus keeping prices lower 
than the scarcity rent would require, delaying the buyer’s backstop investment decision. The 
buyer is compensated by lower prices, but will face increased scarcity when he eventually 
decides to start the time consuming substitution investment. 
While this example is rather theoretical and does not directly apply to the real market, it bears 
many resemblances to the current situation. It also broadens thinking about motivations 
behind oil producers’ decisions and raises serious concerns over oil scarcity in the future. If 
taking long term developments into account, producers have an incentive to keep consumers 
dependent as long as it is economically viable. This could be achieved by overproducing 
current production and misinforming consumers that reserves were abundant. As it happens, 
OPEC and especially Saudi-Arabia have been accused of doing exactly this. While the 
conclusion falls into the unscientific category of wild conspiracy theories and has no evidence 
to back it up, it still is an interesting thought.  
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4 Discussion 
The price formation of crude oil is clearly far from simple. The basis for the price is formed 
by factors “below ground” – meaning scarce reserves, extraction costs and such. Still “above 
ground” factors, such as price subsidies, OPEC decisions and market distortions have a large 
role to play. Finally the end users set the demand based on their needs and alternatives. 
 
Figure 4.1: Relations between different factors affecting oil price 
In this thesis I have gone through many theoretical concepts that concern the oil price. While 
they have not given a clear answer to how the price actually is determined, the study has been 
highly useful in helping to understand underlying conditions and limits. The above picture 
shows concluding relationships that have become apparent in this thesis. It is surely just one 
of many ways of presenting the price drivers. 
The goal of this paper was not at any phase to forecast the oil price. I considered the task too 
challenging to begin with and now after the study I am convinced that it was the right choice. 
The difficulty in forecasting oil price lies in the great degree of uncertainty in several crucial 
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factors. A good example of this uncertainty is the extreme jump in the annual long-term price 
forecasts of both IEA and EIA during the writing of this thesis. Both of the price forecasts 
nearly doubled their reference case estimate for the next twenty years. For example: the EIA 
forecasts for sweet light crude oil price for 2030 published in June 2008 was $70.45, while 
less than a year later in March 2009 the new version of the forecast was expecting a price of 
$130.43 – the prices are in real terms and taking into account the price drop of late 2008. 
Similar changes also happened in the IEA forecasts, although some months earlier. The 
reports explain the change by having obtained more precise field-by-field data on global 
capacity. One explanation might be that as 2008 was not a record year only in price, but also 
in production, we had never seen the costs of those marginal fields, because they had never 
before been in production. While these two public institutions clearly changed their view, 
other price views still exist and the future does not look any clearer than a year ago. 
4.1 Conclusions from the literature review 
Hotelling’s theory with its extensions fits the oil market principally well. It does not however 
explain recent oil prices as such. Various unanticipated factors affect the price path constantly 
thus making it practically impossible to simplify price movements into a consistent theory. 
Hotelling’s scarcity rent is still a valid concept and its effect should be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the market, especially in the future if, and when, resources are 
nearing depletion.  
OPEC has historically shaken the market by cutting production and thus using market power. 
After the 1990’s however OPEC’s production changes have not had a clear impact on the 
price. In the recent price rise OPEC was in fact clearly increasing production without being 
able to stop prices from rising. OPEC’s disputed reserve estimates and weak compliance in 
announced quotas further weaken the impression of a cartel in control of prices. In the first oil 
crisis in the 1970’s OPEC emerged into public knowledge when cutting production on 
political motives. Throughout its history it has brought its members a lot of political attention 
and power. The current situation gives OPEC the chance to prove it being more than a 
political tool. During fall 2008 and spring 2009 OPEC has announced supply cuts to stabilize 
oil prices. So far there has been only a slight recovery in the prices. 
The price peak in 2008 was often said to be a bubble and thus not a result of matching supply 
and demand. Scarce information on the oil market and participants’ differing views would be 
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theoretically good grounds for bubbles to form. Physical arbitrage constraints however set 
conditions on bubble formation. Speculative oil positions should lead to clear changes in oil 
storage. This was however not observed during the price peak. Demand was continuously met 
on the market, although with high prices. Tight market conditions allowed the price to rise 
quickly without any clear market inefficiency. Causality tests also show that there was no 
systematic speculator behavior driving prices up. Still speculators in general were blamed, 
while actually speculators are much needed in the market to generate liquidity and fight 
bubbles through arbitrage. 
A general explanation for the high prices in the past few years is that supply capacity was not 
keeping up with the growing demand. Oil supply reached record highs with the help of new, 
more expensive production. From the previously presented investment plans we can see that 
there was significant new capacity coming on line in OPEC countries in 2009. The fact that 
these plans existed may have also discouraged investments in more expensive fields as 
cheaper sources in the Middle East were coming on line soon. This might have also further 
tightened the market. With this constrained inelastic supply prices got surprisingly high for 
some periods of time. Crude oil was priced not only by highest marginal costs but also by 
convenience yields of giving up inventory and scarcity rent of those who had inventories at 
the time of the crunch. Maybe even more significant than supply tightness, is the inelasticity 
of oil demand. For a large amount of the demand there are simply no substitutes available. Oil 
consumption is also often necessary for basic needs and is thus not easily given up. Taxes in 
western countries and subsidies in many developing countries both (although differently) 
further soften the price changes perceived by consumers. 
4.2 Final thoughts on the future of oil prices 
While prices are at low levels again, the most crucial long-term drivers remain. Oil demand 
will inevitably continue growing even if it is now held back for a few years by the stagnating 
world economy. Old oil fields will decline and new replacing capacity will cost more to 
produce. Surely oil will not run out, but it will become increasingly more expensive. Demand 
has not become any more elastic, which means that if the market tightens again we can see 
another price spike. The tightening could happen in clearly less than ten years as current low 
prices are seriously hurting investments in new capacity. It might be that the future price path 
looks like a steadily growing saw tooth, with the market going through consecutive crunches 
and crashes. 
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When serious substitutes start to emerge, demand is bound to become more elastic. This is 
mostly important for the transportation sector, where currently practically no fuel alternatives 
exist. Current developments in electric cars seem very promising, but they would only solve 
the problem of dependence “at the pump”. The approximately same amount of energy needs 
to be created in some way and currently the most likely way would be burning coal for 
electricity. While coal is cheaper and somewhat less scarce, it emits clearly more greenhouse 
gasses and is likewise non-renewable. It seems that even if we manage to get rid of oil 
dependence, we will have more problems ahead. 
In the current environment OPEC is in a big role. For investments in oil capacity to happen 
efficiently, oil price needs to be on a stable level or a steady trend. To balance market 
disturbances, excess capacity from OPEC is needed to compensate. OPEC countries face a 
situation where it is beneficial for them to keep the world dependent on oil as long as possible 
by stabilizing prices. Recent high price levels have however already pushed forward 
significant efforts in research for substitutes. We are thus heading towards more balanced mix 
of energy sources. I hope that we will get there before oil dependence causes larger problems.  
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6 Appendix 1: Complete derivation of Hotelling’s rule with 
degradation: 
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𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡   
?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + ?̇?𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  
?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑐𝑐′(𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞 
 
?̇?𝜋
𝜋𝜋
−
𝑐𝑐′(𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞
𝜋𝜋
= 𝑟𝑟 
 
?̇?𝜋(𝑡𝑡)
𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡)𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟 
 
 
 
 
